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Abstract
This research focuses on the Emory and Obed Watersheds in the Cumberland Plateau in
Central Tennessee and the Lower Hatchie River Watershed in West Tennessee. A framework
based on market and nonmarket valuation techniques was used to empirically estimate
economic values for environmental amenities and negative externalities in these areas. The
specific techniques employed include a variation of hedonic prioing and discrete choice
conjoint analysis (i.e., choice modeling), in addition to geographic information systems (GIS)
and remote sensing. Microeconomic models of agent behavior, including random utility theory
and profit maximization, provide the principal theoretical foundation linking valuation
techniques and econometric models. The generalized method of moments estimator for a first
order spatial autoregressive function and mixed logit models are the principal econometric
methods applied within the framework.
The dissertation is subdivided into three separate chapters written in a manuscript format.
The first chapter provides the necessary theoretical and mathematical conditions that must be
satisfied in order for a forest amenity enhancement program to be implemented. Such a
program is possible and would yield an efficient outcome under three conditions: (1)
contributors are willing to pay an amount that maximizes the utility they derive from forest
amenities; ( 2) an intermediary party sets a compensation price based on contributor aggregate
willingness to pay such that the social value of the program is maximized; and (3) a
participating landowner maximizes profit given this incentive. The second chapter evaluates
the effect of forest land cover and information about future land use change on respondent
preferences and willingness to pay for alternative hypothetical forest amenity enhancement
options. Land use change information and the amount of forest land cover significantly
influenced respondent preferences, choices, and stated willingness to pay. Hicksian welfare
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estimates for proposed enhancement options ranged from $57.42 to $25.53, depending on the
policy specification, information level, and econometric model. The third chapter presents
economic values for negative externalities associated with channelization that affect the
productivity and overall market value of forested wetlands. Results of robust, generalized
moments estimation of a double logarithmic first-order spatial autoregressive error model
(inverse distance weights with spatial dependence up to 1500m) indicate that the implicit cost
of damages to forested wetlands caused by channelization equaled -$5,438 ha·1•
Collectively, the results of this dissertation provide economic measures of the damages to
and benefits of environmental assets, help private landowners and policy makers identify the
amenity attributes preferred by the public, and improve the management of natural resources.
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Part 1

Introduction and Overview

1

1.

Introduction
The absence of a property rights structure for environmental amenities such as clean air,

clean water, and landscape aesthetics precludes the application of traditional market
mechanisms for assigning monetary values to improvements in or damages to these amenities.
However, environmental amenities influence the preferences and decisions of consumers in
the market. Similarly, the market actions of consumers affect, both positively and negatively,
the quality and quantity of environmental amenities. Thus, the problem exists to quantify the
external effects of amenities on consumer behavior and the effects of consumers on the
environment in order to develop policies that will facilitate progress toward a sustainable level
of environmental quality.
The discipline of environmental valuation (EV), or more generally, natural resource and
environmental economics, has evolved to link activity in the economy to the functioning of the
environment. This link is based on models adapted from microeconomic theory of agent
behavior including utility and profit maximization. While casual observation would imply a
clear connection between the environment and the economy, with the former serving as a
primary source of raw materials and waste disposal for the latter, efforts to connect the two
have proven to be complicated and suspect (Hausman 1993). However, in cases of natural
resource damage assessment (NRDA) or national economic development (NED) benefits the
link between the environment and the economy must be made and quantified. Moreover, for
more general policy ev�luation or in the early stages of policy formation, information
concerning the relationship between the environment and the economy can provide useful
insight into potential tradeoffs or consequences of alternative actions. Thus, environmental
valuation may be seen as unavoidable for some while a significant contribution to the
improvement of the environment, and correspondingly, society, for others.
2

Environmental valuation researchers have developed and refined specific techniques over
several decades to quantify this relationship in economic terms, i.e., prices. These techniques
rely on the preference structure of the consumer and utilize either stated (direct) or revealed
(indirect) methods to equate the consumer's held preferences into willingness to pay (WTP)
estimates. In stated preference (SP) methods, researchers apply a survey format to establish a
hypothetical market for environmental goods and services (EGS): Market participants are
directly questioned about their preferences for EGS and willingness to pay to secure
improvements in them. Standard administration formats for SP surveys, or constructed
markets, include telephone, mail, and in-person interviews. Contingent valuation (CV) and
conjoint analysis (CJ) are two principal methodologies. Both CV and CJ have been accepted
by the Federal government as means of assessing the nonmarket values, in particular, nonuse
values, in cases of natural resource damages (Arrow et al. 1993).
Stated preference methods have been criticized on a number of grounds but primarily for
the lack of realism in the constructed market and hypothetical nature of willingness to pay
(Diamond and Hausman 1994). The criticism stems from market participants expressing only
intended behavior through choices and stated WTP that is in turn contingent upon hypothetical

scenarios specified by the researcher. For example, a researcher may ask the respondent to
choose their most preferred stream restoration plan from a set of proposed plans and then how
much they would be willing to pay to have the plan enacted. The argument is that the
hypothetical context in which WTP is solicited should yield hypothetical monetary values for
EGS. Accordingly, the question is raised: Should hypothetical values be applied in lawsuits
where significant fines are assessed to the damager or for evaluating alternative policies that
could have significant welfare implications?

3
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Revealed preference (RP) methods offer an alternative to the hypothetical data generating
process of SP methods by inferring prices for EGS through analysis of consumer behavior for
related market goods. Hedonic pricing and the travel cost method are two principal techniques.
In the case of hedonic pricing, economic values for EGS are derived by econometrically
decomposing the market price of a good (typically housing) into prices for individual
attributes defining the good. Assuming environmental conditions are an element of this
attribute set, an economic value can be similarly assigned to varying levels of these
conditions. The travel cost method relies on a comparable methodology in that the expenditure
and number of trips outdoor recreationists incur during pursuit of their activities can be
incorporated into econometric models to derive the economic value of changes in
environmental conditions at visited sites. Complications with RP methods include an indirect
relationship between EGS and the market good, large data sets (given the predominantly cross
sectional nature of RP studies), omitted variable bias, multiple purpose trips, substitute sites,
and multicollinearity, to name a few.
Given the assumptions and econometric difficulties associated with revealed and stated
preference approaches, the opportunity cost method (OCM) presents a viable alternative for
environmental valuation. The OCM is used to value environmental goods and services by
computing the economic value of opportunity costs, in terms of forgone market benefits,
associated with environmental protection. This method may be preferred over the
aforementioned alternatives because derived economic values for EGS are based on a direct
I

relationship to market goods. For example, the monetary value of a wetland being considered
for a residential subdivision would be calculated as the net present value of the revenue stream
associated with the development. Mathematically,
T

Pwetland �

L { P ( I -BD, t I ) }

t=O

1

=

P OC.D

[ 1]
4

where P denotes market price, B denotes net monetary benefits of development D, p is the
discount rate equal to (l+�r1, with� denoting rate of time preference, t indexes time, and OC
represents opportunity costs. This calculation can be performed with relative ease, especially
in comparison to SP and RP methods, since market data are readily available. However, a
tradeoff of the simplistic mathematical (and data) structure of OCM arises if we interpret
equation [1] as stating that the market price of a wetland must be at least as great as forgone
market benefits (i.e., opportunity costs) of development. This interpretation implies the OCM
can only yield relative magnitudes, as opposed to specific values. In certain circumstances,
such as preliminary policy evaluation, the limitations of OCM may not be of consequence and
derived values can provide useful information. However, for NRDA and NED cases, specific
values for EGS are necessary and thus computed using stated or revealed preference methods.
I do not pursue further the application of OCM but consider a comparison of estimates derived
with this methodology and those computed in this dissertation to constitute a worthwhile
study.
To that end, this dissertation applies both revealed and stated preference techniques for the
valuation of environmental quality in two Tennessee watersheds. In concert with these
applications, geographic information systems (GIS) are used to analyze spatial factors
affecting individual preferences and willingness to pay for EGS. Geographic information
systems (GIS) and remotely sensed data (e.g., satellite images of vegetative ground cover) are
quickly becoming cornerstones in environmental and natural resource economic research
(Bateman et al. 2002). These tools enable researchers to model the spatial complexities
involved in environmental issues, for example, the scale of an oil spill in a natural resource
damage assessment case or spatial autocorrelation in hedonic price studies (Anselin 2001).
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Moreover, GIS and remote sensing may provide for more efficient means of benefit transfer
(e.g., transferring benefits from one study area to another based on groupings of pixels with
similar spectral reflectance properties). GIS and remote sensing, though, may contribute the
most by focusing research (e.g., in a survey study, GI S can be used to identify upstream and
downstream residents and then model their responses as a function of location) and reducing
the time involved with planning, acquiring, and analyzing spatial and non-spatial data. As time
progresses, more of the geographic information necessary for environmental and natural
resource economic research will become available and at a lower cost. Increased access to
higher quality spatial data will prove to yield significant improvements in EV in the future.
The research for this dissertation will be using the latest remotely sensed imagery (LandSat 7
ETM+), the most advanced spatial imaging and analysis software (ArcGIS and Imagine), and
readily available geographic data (e.g., streets and streams).
The principal purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that environmental valuation
techniques, geographic information systems, and remote sensing can serve a role in the
sustainable use of forests, streams, and natural landscapes of Tennessee. These natural
resources generate multiple public benefits but the supply is held predominantly by private
landowners; approximately 89 percent of all forested land in Tennessee is privately owned
(Schweitzer 2000). With private landowners holding a disproportionate share of forestland, the
public must work with these landowners to increase the supply of environmental benefits.
However, private landowners are under no obligation to undertake management activities to
improve the supply or refuse bids to convert the land to another use. Government programs
designed to compensate willing (or participating) landowners for activity costs are limited, in
both person nel and funds. Thus, similar to the problem given in the introductory paragraph,
the challenge is to design a system to assess the public's willingness to pay, extract such
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payments (either through voluntary contributions to a non-profit organization or tax
increases), and then compensate landowners for incurred expenditures related to resource
enhancing management activities. Such a framework would protect and improve the supply of
natural resources, and in particular, environmental amenities such as wildlife habitat, for
current and future generations.
I present this framework in Part 2 and in Part 3 discuss the results of a stated preference,
choice modeling based constructed market applied in the evaluation of willingness to pay, and
more generally, support for improving the current stock of forest amenities. Comparing
principal results between the two chapters, I find that people are willing to pay (approximately
$25) but that landowners are not willing to manage. This discrepancy between supply and
demand represents a significant hurdle that will require extensive landowner education to
overcome.
In contrast to the case presented above where landowners are encouraged to improve
public benefits, landowners can produce a portion of the negative externalities that impact
forests, streams, and natural landscapes. For example, harvesting activities conducted too
close to a stream can lead to increases in stream temperature, which has consequences for
stream biodiversity and productivity, as well as reductions in water quality due to increased
sediment from erosion. Additionally, management activities dominated by poor harvesting
practices (e.g., high grading) will eventually result in a forest comprised of overstory and
understory species that contribute little to society both monetarily and non-monetarily. It is
clear from the examples that landowners' activities can reduce resource quality and public
benefits. In these cases, environmental valuation provides unique information that can help
landowners, non-landowners, and policy makers collectively work together to improve
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management practices and progress toward environmental sustainability within the context of
further economic growth and development.
Part 4 presents one such case of lost public benefits due to past agricultural, forestry, and
channelization activities. The combination of these activities has resulted in excessive
sedimentation in streams of the Lower Hatchie River Watershed, which has in

turn

substantially reduced forest value, biological productivity, biodiversity, and hydrological
functioning. In this case, a revealed preference method was applied to compute economic
values for damages associated directly with channelization and indirectly, damages from
excessive sedimentation. I present the results, or prices, as representing a new source of
information that would enable policy makers to evaluate in equivalent economic terms costs
associated with the current level of damage and benefits of alternative restoration projects.
Supplemental to valuing benefits and costs for policy and management evaluation,
environmental valuation plays a role in private resource conservation decisions and land use
planning in Tennessee. Resource conservation organizations may rely on economic valuation
of environmental assets to justify land purchases or projects that would otherwise not be
feasible when evaluated on market values. For example, a large forested tract near an urban
area will be valued for its potential developable use but the true value may be much greater as
the tract provides wildlife habitat, scenic beauty, and erosion control. Environmental valuation
techniques provide the tools an organization needs to derive public welfare estimates that
could then be combined with market values to more accurately evaluate the project. Similarly,
in a land use planning context, EV techniques provide planners the capability to gather
information on public preferences for alternative proposals while simultaneously determining
the social welfare (in economic terms) of each alternative. Accordingly, EV can lead to more
comprehensive project analysis and ultimately, a more efficient allocation of land among
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preservation, conservation, and development objectives. This application of EV may assume
an even more important role in the future as land use continues to change from natural
(agricultural, forest, and open space) to developed (transportation networks, urban, and
industrial).

2.

Objectives
The goal of this research was to develop prices for externalities and public goods on both

public and private lands using forest valuation, environmental valuation, and spatial data
analysis techniques. Principal methods included a variation of hedonic pricing, choice
modeling, and geographic information systems (GIS). Study areas included the Emory and
Obed Watersheds on the Cumberland Plateau in Central Tennessee and the Lower Hatchie
River Watershed in West Tennessee. Specific objectives for this research include the
following:

1.) Establish theoretical and mathematical conditions for aligning the behavior of people
willing to contribute to a program designed to improve the supply of forest amenities,
landowners who control the available supply, and a third party non-profit organization who
serves as a bridge between contributors and landowners.

2.) Develop a multi-class land cover classification of the Emory-Obed watershed using
remotely sensed imagery, geographic information systems, and field data.

3.) Apply choice modeling in Cumberland and Morgan counties to assess willingness to pay
for a program designed to provide landowners compensation in exchange for managing their
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land for improved non-timber forest benefits. Additionally, test whether different
specifications of the choice scenario and the amount (m2) of forest cover within a 1OOm radius
of each respondent influence choice and willingness to pay.

4.) Construct a spatial theoretic, implicit valuation model to monetize impacts of specific
ecological and anthropogenic factors on forest productivity in the bottomland hardwood
forests along the Hatchie River and tributaries of the Hatchie.

3.

Study Area Descriptions
The study areas for this research include the Lower Hatchie River Watershed and the

Emory-Obed Watershed. These two watersheds are spatially and ecologically distinct yet
share a common lack of biological and economic information. For this reason and due to
concerns over environmental quality, they were selected for analysis. Specific reasons
underlying selection of each watershed as well as short area descriptions are provided below.
The Lower Hatchie River Watershed (LHRW) (HUC 08010208) is located in West
Tennessee and includes the counties of Chester, Lauderdale, Madison, Hardeman, Fayette,
Haywood, and Tipton. The watershed comprises approximately 3,820 square km, 56,994 ha of
which is bottomland hardwood forest (BLH), and contains the State designated Scenic Hatchie
River (EPA 2004). The Hatchie River is one of the longest unchannelized rivers remaining in
the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Valley and has been named one of the "Last Great Places" by
I

the Nature Conservancy. One of the unique features of the Hatchie is that it flows northward,
from its point of origin in northern Mississippi to the Mississippi River in northwestern
Tennessee.
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The LHRW is marked by flat topography, seasonal and permanent flooding, and soils
dominated by fine wind-blown soil (loess). These natural features are significant factors in the
ability of the watershed to provide highly productive wildlife habitat, biodiversity, landscape
aesthetics, timber production, and opportunities for recreation. Channelization, levee
construction, excessive sedimentation, and subsequently, BLH conversion, are the primary
factors affecting the stability of the LHRW. Channelization is an anthropogenic practice
intended to focus stream and river reaches to narrow channels in order to increase the amount
of allowable forest and agricultural land. Levee construction can occur during channelization
activities and is another means of decreasing the area drained by a watercourse. The excessive
amount of sediment being deposited in tributaries of the Hatchie River and in the river itself is
due primarily to upland agricultural and forestry activities but is magnified by the highly
erodible loess. The excessive sedimentation in the LHRW has resulted in the formation of
valley plugs and shoals, degraded fish habitat, diminished floodplain functioning, and
increased mortality of BLH (from prolonged flooding and root suffocation). Conversion of
BLH refers more to the loss of BLH from excessive sedimentation than to urban development
pressures. The collective detrimental impacts of channelization, levee construction, and
excessive sedimentation on floodplains and bottomland hardwood forests in the LHRW
include diminished capabilities to assimilate and store nutrients and pollutants, recharge
aquifers, and abate floods. Furthermore, significant reductions in biological productivity,
ecological stability, biodiversity, and forest value have been noted (see Part 4).
Research was conducted in the upper section of the Lower Hatchie River Watershed to
price the negative effects of excessive sedimentation and channelization on the bottomland
hardwood ecosystem. The LHRW was selected for its unique and ecologically diverse
bottomland hardwood ecosystem, complex of nonindustrial private landowners and objectives,
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supply of productive wildlife habitat, significance in water provision and quality maintenance,
and role in the central and western Tennessee economies. Each of these reasons underscores
the prominence of the LHRW in both private and public goods provision.
The Emory/Obed Watershed (EOW) (HUC 06010208) is located in East Tennessee and
includes the counties of Bledsoe, Cumberland, Fentress, Morgan, and Roane. The EOW drains
22
, 58 square km with approximately 92% of the area located in Cumberland and Morgan
Counties (EPA 2004). The federally designated Natural Wild and Scenic Emory and Obed
Rivers flow through the EOW. These rivers provide multiple recreational opportunities, in
particular, whitewater paddling and rock climbing. The economy in the EOW is
predominantly dependent on manufacturing and retail trade with supplementary income from
outdoor recreation-based activities (Census Bureau 1997). Second home construction, retiree
emigration, and parcelization are the primary threats to the viability of the ecosystem in the
EOW. This research intends to provide results that will help land managers, land use planners,
residents, and private landowners realize the full economic value of the natural resources in
the EOW and incorporate that information into improved natural resource and economic
development.

4. Methods Review
The following brief reviews of the hedonic price method and discrete choice conjoint
analysis, or choice modeling, serve as precursors to more detailed examinations in later
I

chapters. The first review covers the revealed preference method of hedonic pricing and the
second review concerns the stated preference method choice modeling.
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4.1.

Hedonic Price Method

The purpose of this review is to set the stage for extending the hedonic price method
(HPM) to the theory and estimation procedures of spatial econometrics. Part 4 provides an
extensive review of spatial econometrics as applied to forested wetland valuation, yet requires
a basic understanding of hedonic pricing.
The theoretical model most widely applied in hedonic studies was developed by Rosen
(1974) and Freeman (1993) and is based on Lancaster's (1966) theory that a consumer's
preferences are dependent on the characteristics of the goods, notj ust the goods themselves.
The characteristics theory of Lancaster provides the essence of HPM in that the economic
value of a non-priced attribute defining a market good can be uncovered through
decomposition of the good's market price. The term decomposition implies a statistical
procedure of regression analysis. Thus, the HPM provides a construct consistent with
economic theory and well-known statistical methods. For this reason, it has received
considerable attention in the environmental valuation literature.
There are essentially two stages in estimation of the hedonic price method, with the first
stage involving derivation of marginal implicit prices for goods attributes and the second
calculating welfare estimates based onfirst stage estimates. For the purpose of the review, and
dissertation, I will only discuss the first stage. The following discussion is based on Rosen
(1974) and Freeman(1993).
The first stage of the hedonic price method identifies the market price of good m as a
function of its characteristics:

m= l , .
.

.

,r

[2]

13

whereP is market price, Z is ann x k vector of attributes describing the good, andr is the total
number of goods under evaluation. Equation[2] is referred to as the hedonic pricefunction. If
the good is taken to be a house, then equation[2] can be written as:

P=p(L, S, N, Q)

[3]

whereP is ann x 1 vector of transaction prices, L is ann x 1 vector of lot sizes, S is ann x k
vector of structural characteristics (e. g. , number of rooms and age), N is an n x k vector of
neighborhood characteristics (e. g. , location to a maj or thoroughfare and quality of schools),
andQ is ann x k vector of environmental amenities.
The link between market prices for homes, attributes describing each home, and attribute
prices is the direct utility function of individual homebuyers. In this framework, individual i
purchases the mth home from all other homes -m because that particular home contains the
optimal mix of attributes.That is, the combination of attributes provides the greatest utility to
individual i, given budgetary constraints. We can form ally define this relationship with the
following:

s.t. Y; =X+ 8(Zm)

[4]

where U denotes direct utility, X denotes a composite commodity with price normalized to
one, Z denotes attributes of the home, Y is income, and 8 denotes price of elements in Z.
Equation [4] states that individual} will choose levels ofX andZ such that constrained utility
will be maximized. Violation of utility maximization behavior in the housing market would
14

undermine the use of hedonic pricing for environmental valuation and imply that consumers
are irrational decision makers. An additional assumption for equation [4] holds that consumer
preferences for housing bundles are weakly separable, which allows the researcher to
investigate the demand for housing characteristics independent of the prices of other goods
(Freeman 1993, p. 371).
Combining equations [3] and [4] allows us to derive a mathelflatical expression for the
marginal implicit price of any element inZ. For the case of an environmental amenity q in
vectorQ, the implicit price is calculated by partially differentiating the hedonic pricefunction
with respect to q and setting the solution equal to the ratio of levels q* andX* that maximize
theLagrangian of equation[4]:

(8U I 8q*)I (8U I 8X*)= 8P I 8q*

[5]

Equation [5] represents thefirst order condition for the choice of the environmental amenity.
The left hand side corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution between the amenity and
the composite commodity,

or equivalently,

the marginal willingness to pay for the

environmental amenity. The partial derivative (right hand side of equation [5]) yields the
marginal implicit price for the good, or the additional amount that must be paid by an
individual to move to another home with more of the environmental amenity, all other things
being equal (Freeman 1993). Given a linear functional form of the hedonic price function
.(equation[3])

P=a+ftZ+ &

c-N(O, d)

[6]
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whereP is house sale price, f3 is a conformable vector of weights for housing attributes, and&
is a random error term, the marginal implicit price is simply the coefficient/3q from ordinary
least squares estimation.
Economic theory does not suggest a specificfunctional form for the hedonic pricefunction
and as a result, this issue has received considerable attention in the literature. Rosen(1974, p.
37) states that the linear form is not consistent with economic theory since it implies perfect
substitution between housing attributes(he refers to this as costless repacking), thus it should
not be applied in empirical analysis. Based on this assertion, various nonlinear functional
forms have been applied and include quadratic, semi-logarithmic, double-logarithmic, and
Box-Cox transformations (Box and Cox 1964). The general conclusion from these
applications has been that the choice of the appropriate representation of the hedonic price
function should be determined on a case by case basis with emphasis on the form that provides
the best fit of the data (Cassel and Mendelsohn 1985, Halstead et al. 1997). Functional form
specification is an important issue in hedonic studies because application of an incorrect form
can yield errors in the implicit prices (Cropper et al. 1988) and significantly affect the
conclusions (Halvorsen and Pollakowski 1981) We test several functional forms in the
.

analysis inPart 4 to evaluate potential differences.

4.2.

Choice Modeling

Discrete choice conjoint analysis or choice modeling (CM) is a multiattribute stated
preference method for determining the economic value of environmental goods and services.
Choice modeling is one of four specific types of conjoint analysis, which is a survey based
methodology developed by mathematical psychologists for the marketing profession in the
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1960's(Farber andGriner2000). Ratings, rankings, and graded pair comparisons comprise the
other three elicitation formats(Louviere 1988).
Generally, in a CM survey the participant is asked to evaluate simultaneously several
policy options that will provide a good or service at varying quality levels. The participant
then chooses the option that contains the levels she most prefers. The multiple attribute format
ofCM allows the researcher to determine the relative worth of eachfittribute quality level and
establish a preference structure for survey participants. From this structure, preference
orderings are determ ined (e. g. , respondents prefer policy option A to option B and C),
willingness to pay measures estimated, and changes in welfare calculated. Recently,
environmental economists have applied CM for these reasons and because it allows for the
evaluation of tradeoffs(through the inclusion of substitutes), more detailed presentation of the
good, reduced framing bias, and wider applicability of the results compared to contingent
valuation(Hanley et al. 1998).
Similar to contingent valuation(CV), though, choice modeling is a utility based method in
that the option chosen by the individual is revealed preferred to all other feasible options.
Additionally, for both methods standard utility theory is extended to allow for unobservable
elements not captured in the survey instrument that influence the survey participant's choice.
In order to account for these elements, utility includes an error term that varies randomly
across survey participants. This form ulation of the basic microeconomic model of utility
maximization is referred to as random utility theory(RUT) and is based on the work of Luce
(1959) and McFadden(1974). FollowingRUT, the utility function applied in hedonic pricing
for participanti (equation[4]) can be separated into a linear combination of systematic(V) and
random(e) components:
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[7]

whereZ is a vector of attributes of theJ(h option in the choice set, R is a vector of individual
characteristics, X is a vector of observed option and individual attributes, p a conformable
vector of parameters or part-worths, and a stochastic term e. Equation [7] states that survey
participanti derives latent, or unobservable, utility U* from optionk in the set of all optionsK
and that the systematic component is the only part that can be measured by the researcher. A
linearfunctional form is typically specified for the systematic term.
Since there are multiple options inK the participant can choose, the researcher is interested
in uncovering elements inRandZ that influence the participant's choice of a particular option
k. Thus, a probabilityfunction based on equation [7] for explaining choice of option k overh
canbe constructed:

Pr;(k= 1I W) = Pr;{X,P; + e;k > X,P; + e;h}

V k �handk,h e

K

[8]

or by simply rearranging the expression:

Pr;(k= 1I W) = Pr;{X,JJ; - X,P; > e;h - e;k}

[9]

where W is an aggregate term denoting measured and unmeasured factors. Equations [8] and
[9] state that option k will be chosen over some other optionh if latent utility survey
participant i derives from k exceeds that fromh. Equation [9] gives rise to a cumulative
distribution function which can be econometrically modeled given certain distributional
assumptions on e. As a note, since utility U* is unobservable the mean and variance of e are
18

not identified and the researcher must impose structure or a specific distribution on e. If the
error terms are assumed to have a Weibull distribution (i.e., identically and independently
distributed with aType I extreme value distribution), the probability of choosing optionk over
his given by the conditional logit model (McFadden 1974):

K

Pr;(k = 11 W) = Pr; { U;k* > U;h*} = exp(X,JJ;)I L [exp(Xsfl;)]

[10 ]

s=l

The conditional logit model is an appropriate econometric representation of survey
participant choices in discrete choice conjoint analysis because it models choice probabilities
as a function of the attributes and levels in the selected optionas wellas those inthe options
not selected.1 However, the conditional logit model assumes that the probability of choosingk
is invariant to the addition or exclusion of other optionsfromK. This assumption is referred to
as the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives or IIA. Since this assumption may be
violated in our analyses and due to the modeling of participant choice over multiple choice
occasions (thus giving rise to a panel data set), mixed logit models will also be estimated?
The conditional logit model is estimated with maximum likelihood methods and the
resulting coefficients can be used to estimate the welfare gain or loss associated with
decreases or increases in certain elements ofX. Accordingly, the compensating variation (CV)

1

Equation [10] may be referred to as the multinomial logit model since vector X includes individual

specific attributes that do not vary across choices. These attributes are included in econometric
estimation of equation [10] by interacting each with an alternative specific constant.

2 Mixed logit models (Train 2003) account for correlation in the unobservable components of

choice, i.e., E[e;t. e!i] * 0, across individuals and choice occasions. Thus, the IIA assumption is not
required in mixed logit models. Additionally, mixed logit models explicitly incorporate individual
effects that persist over time (i.e., over choice sets) whereas multinomial or conditional logit models are
intended for cross-sectional data.
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welfare estimate can be computed for an improvement in environmental quality fromq toq'
(q' > q):

tn[

CV = 1/fip*

n

n

K

J

L exp(XkOpi) I L L exp(Xkpi)

i= I

[11]

i= I k= I

where option k0 captures the status quo level q, k' captures the improvement q', fip is the
maximum likelihood coefficient for the payment to secure q', p is a vector of estimated
parameters (except for fip), i indexes survey participants (i = l ,

. . .

,n), and CV measures the

change in the individual's income(holding utility constant) that would leave heras well off at
the status quo level k0 as she would be at the higher level k� Thus, through the application of
choice modeling and the responses of individuals to options presented in the survey, an
economic value(CV) can be placed on improved environmental qualityq'.

The remainder of the dissertation is organized into three separate parts written as
publishable manuscripts and a concluding part that summ arizes and links all of the results. The
second part is purely theoretical and serves as a foundation for the applied analysis inPart 3.
The third chapter applies the stated preference technique choice modeling to the valuation of
forest amenities and evaluates spatial and aspatial information effects in constructed markets.
I

Finally, Part 4 presents a new method for developing a set of prices for externalities and
ecological relationships in forested wetlands. This method is based on the theory of hedonic
pricing and tested using spatial econometric models. Part 2 has been submitted to theJournal
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ofForest Economics andPart4 to theJournal ofEnvironmental Economics and Management.
The third chapter will be submitted toLand Economics.
Within this dissertation, I do not present a detailed discussion of the development of the
land cover classification for the Cumberland Plateau(Objective2). I provide a brief overview
of the process on page 70 but refer readers toStrickland(2003) for a comprehensive, detailed
description. As a comment on this process, JeffStrickland and I deditated approximately three
months of six to seven days per week· in front of a computer analyzing pixels on remotely
sensed(i.e. , satellite) imagery in order to develop the classification. We are pleased to report
an overall accuracy of 90 percent for these efforts. The forest class of the land cover
classification was applied in the choice modeling analysis ofCumberland and Morgan county
residents' preferences and stated willingness to pay for improved forest amenities(Part 3).
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Part 2

Forest Amenity Provision Within a Compensation Framework
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This chapter is a slightlyr evised ver sion of a paper by the same name submitted to theJournal

ofForest Economics in2004 byAar onR. Wells. . . . . .

.

Abstract
A compensation framewor k based on a micr oeconomic analysis of agent behavior is
developed for the case of impr oved for est amenity pr ovision. The lack of funding and
competitive enr ollment in curr ent feder al pr ograms and non-pr ofit and pr ivate initiatives for
pr ivate landowner s coupled with for est pr oduct pr ices that do notr eflect the amenity value of
for ests highlight the impor tance of a for est amenity en hancement pr ogram.We show that such
a pr ogram is possible and would yield an efficient outcome under thr ee conditions: (1)
contributor s are willing to pay an amount that maximizes utility they der ive from for est
amenities; (2) an inter mediary par ty sets a compensation pr ice based on contributor aggregate
willingness to pay such that the social value of the pr ogram is maximized; and (3) a
par ticipating landowner maximizes pr ofit given this incentive. Changes in these conditions
and the incor por ation of stated and r evealed pr efer ence nonmar ket valuation techniques ar e
futur e dir ections for the framewor k.

Keywords:

N ontimber values; Public goods; Dir ect compensation; Behavior al analysis;

Stated pr efer ence

1.

Introduction
;

For est ecosystems pr ovide a unique set of benefits that ar e neither r ecognized nor traded in
rt aditional mar kets. Scenic beauty, car bon sequestr ation, wildlife habitat, and soil stabilization
r epr esent a few of the multiple nonmar ket goods and ser vices or alternatively, for est
amenities, supplied by for ests. Th e public goods natur e of for est amenities impedes mar kets
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from capitalizing these benefi ts into land values. Additionally, prices for forest products, such
as timber or ginseng, do not refl ect the value of forest amenities or the effects of product
removal on their integrity. Thus, landowners have limited monetary incentive to improve the
supply of these amenities. The lack of market based incentives for improved forest
management has typically been filled by landowner assistance programs funded by
governm ent and private entities.

However,

current assistance

programs are either

underdeveloped or marked by limited fun ding and competitive en rollment, which can act to
discourage potential landowners.
N on-industrial, private forest landowners own approximately 5 8 percent of forestland in
the Un ited States, representing a maj ority share of the land capable of producing forest
amenities. However, only 5 percent of landowners have a written management plan and 97
percent hold their land for reasons other than timber production. Approximately 70 percent of
forestland is in ownerships exceeding 40 ha, with more than 85 percent of the landowners
holding less than20 ha(Birch 1 996). This characterization of forest landowners presents a set
of challenges for the provision of forest amenities for three primary reasons. First, economies
of scale may prevent small landownersfrom entering into the amenity program while enabling
large landowners to capture all of the compensation.Second, highlyfragm ented or parcelized
holdings may not provide the area(ha) necessary to provide some amenities (namely, habitat
for forest interior birds). Third, expected participation rates, based on the curr ent number of
owners with a management plan, may be too low to j ustify implementing the program.
A lternatively, a compensation program may be feasible given that nearly all landowners have
preferences for nontimber amenities. If these landowners value the change in land rent from
entering the program (i. e. , marginal benefits) more than the additional costs associated with
;

entry(i. e. , marginal costs), then, as rational economic agents, landowners would be willing to
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participate and the amenity program justified. Attention is directed toward the issue of
landowner participation, and not on contributor or third party participation, because we view
this as the most significant hurdle to the implementation of the program.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate through utility and profit maximization
models that a direct form of monetary compensation in return for forest amenity provision is a
feasible mechanism for increasing net social benefits of forests. We show that a utility
maximizing contributor would be willing to pay an amount that when aggregated across all
contributors and distributed by a value oriented third party satisfies supply conditions for
participating rent-seeking landowners. The framework formalizes and extends the direct
compensation mechanisms currently employed by various types of conservation-guided
organizations, such as The Nature Conservancy and Defenders ofWildlife (see Ferraro 2001).
While the programs provided by these organizations provide a useful basis for our
framework, the case of hunting leases presents a more interesting structure. At present,
hunting leases are the only tangible contract under which private, monetary compensation is
transferred to private forest landowners in exchange for a nontraditional forest product (i.e.,
recreational access). 3 There are other examples of recreational access compensation schemes,
involving off-highway vehicles and rock climbing, but these schemes are not as common as
hunting leases.4 Regardless of the user group, the compensation mechanism for recreational
access provides insight into the possible use of private lands for public goods provision:
landowners who enter into these agreements maintain profit (rent) maximizing (seeking)
behavior, even though the activity generating the costs and revenues is a nonmarket forest
3

Recreational opportunities on private lands are presently not considered a public good and

excluded from the framework we propose because these opportunities imply a type of right to the payee
granted by the landowner that can be used to exclude other parties.
4

An example of the growing popularity of hunting leases on private forestland is the publication by

Timber Mart South, a principal source of forest product prices in the southern United States, of average,
per acre price estimates by state for these leases (Timber Mart South 2003). To our knowledge, a series
of published prices for other outdoor recreational leases does not exist.
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good. Thus, the amenity program should be designed to appeal to the profit (rent) enhancing
opportunities generated by forest amenity provision. On the other hand, research on the
harvesting behavior of private forest landowners indicates that landowners may not be driven
by profit motives since they currently provide forest amenities without compensation (Lee
1 997 , Scarpa et al. 2 000).While this research shows that landowners are willing to manage for

forest amenities, it underscores the importance of assuming active landowners manage with
the intent of maximizing profit. Under our framework, landowners would be compensated for
managing forest amenities, which may increase participation rates among owners, increase
competition and output in amenity production, and lead to profit (rent) maximizing behavior.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 presents the framework from
the perspective of a contributor, third party organization, and participating landowner. Section
3 provides a discussion of the model results and possible extensions to the framework. A

concluding section summarizes the paper and offers an assessment of the practicality of the
proposed compensation program.

2.

Compensation Framework
The forest amenity compensation framework is based on three representative agents:

contributor, conservation guided third party, and private landowner. A contributor is defined
as an individual that is willing to pay some nonnegative sum of money in return for an
improved stock of forest amenities. The third party is essentially an intermediary institution
that collects and distributes contributions, approves participating landowners, and monitors the
forest amenity enhancement program. The representative landowner is a nonindustrial, private
forest landowner that meets certain land size requirements and is willing to accept
;

contributions in return for incurred costs of improving on-site forest amenities. In addition to
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these agents, the compensation framework is based on two models of utility theory - each
borrowing from different economic perspectives on the preference structure of the agent, and a
simple profit function. Random utility theory, which incorporates a stochastic element in
preference modeling, and a Cobb-Douglas value function describe the decision calculus for
the contributor and third party, respectively. The profit model for the landowner contains an
environmental ethic term that helps to explain why an owner may participate in the proposed
framework; this additional term is not typically included in forest supply analyses. In all
models, we assume the agents have perfect information on the benefits of forest amenities, the
outcome from their respective actions is common knowledge, and agents are risk neutral.
Additionally, assume there are a large number of contributors and landowners so that one
individual from either group cannot influence any outcome. 5 For each utility function, assume
strict quasi-concavity, continuity and transitivity of preferences, and local nonsatiation.
Similarly, assume the profit function is continuous and strictly convex in prices. Finally,
assume the functions

are

twice differentiable and monotonic and that all agents know their

preferences and act on these preferences rationally.
For these three models, T is the aggregate current level of forest amenities and T' is the
level of forest amenities that would be provided if the amenity program were active (T'>> 1).
We define level in both quality and quantity terms, with quality referring to more productive
(e.g., greater habitat diversity) or aesthetically appealing (e.g., lower stand density) amenities
and quantity representing the aggregate number of hectares in a forest amenity class. Both T
and T'are vectors of h elements (h = l , . . . ,H), with each element representing a specific level
of a forest amenity (e.g., 25 ha of moderate quality wildlife habitat).
5

The basis of the

A consequence of this assumption is a possible increase in the incentive to free-ride. That is, by

increasing the number of contributors, it is easier for the marginal contributor to decide that a sufficient
number of individuals have contributed such that their additional contribution will not change the
overall outcome. Thus, he does not contribute.
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proposed program is that landowners can improve the level of forest amenities through land
management practices, accordingly T' = L;Lhtih', where i indexes participating landowners (i =
1 , . . . ,1) and

t/ denotes the aggregate contribution (ha) of amenities by i under the program.6

Since T' is a continuous public good (i.e., nonrival and nonexcludable in production and
consumption), each contributor consumes the same amount of T' regardless of their
,

contribution and the third party compensates participating landowners an amount equal to a
share of the sum of individual contributions.7
The principal qualification for landowner participation in the program is approval by the
third party of a forest amenity enhancement plan written by an approved forest manager.
Additional requirements include a minimum and maximum number of hectares in order to
keep enrollment competitive and a minimum number of years enrolled (e.g., 1 0 yrs) so that
management recommendations can be fully implemented and possibly evaluated. Contributors
face a reduced set of enrollment constraints and are principally bound by a voluntary contract
to contribute an annual monetary payment for a specified number of years (e.g., 5 yrs).
Finally, a third party will support the program only if the sum of contributions equals or
exceeds the costs of administering the program.

I

6 For notational convenience, L:

i= 1

=

L;.

7 The opportunity for individuals to free-ride on the contributions of others to the improved supply
of forest amenities is a concern given the public goods nature of these amenities. To address this

problem, we assume that contributors aware of free-riders account for them by either lowering
(possibly, out of frustration) or increasing (to take into account lower aggregate level of contributions)
their contribution amount (i.e, willingness to pay). Contributors oblivious to free-riding simply
;

contribute the amount that maximizes their utility (given budgetary constraints). In any case, the mean
or median contribution from these three types of contributors serves as a useful measure of society's
willingness to pay for improved forest amenity provision - this value (whether mean or median) is
applied in our analysis. We present the framework and model solutions as conditional on the efficiency
reducing, distortionary influence of free-riders.
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2. 1. Utility Maximization: Contributor
A basic assumption underlying the contributor component of the forest amenity
compensation program is that rational, economic agents derive utility from forest amenities:

=

u u(T, z, q)

[1]

where T i s a vector o f current forest amenities, z is a composite good, and q is a vector of
attributes of all other nonmarket goods and services. In equation [1], the individual does not
necessarily consume forest amenities, as she would the composite good, and instead gains
satisfaction from their mere existence. A contributor (or, non free-rider) is defined as an agent
that is indifferent between paying some positive sum of money for improved amenity
provision and remaining at the status quo:

(/)0 > (/) > 0

[2]

where o indexes each contributor and a contributor can be a landowner (i, . . . ,1), but not the
landowner generating the forest amenities.8 The remaining notation is explained as follows:
vo(•) is the indirect utility function, mo denotes income, (/)0 is a continuous contribution amount

that must be greater than some minimum threshold set by the third party, and Po is a vector of
prices for all other goods. Equation [2] identifies the tradeoffs between forest amenities and
other household goods and services a contributor must evaluate when determining an amount

8

In order for the analysis to proceed and for the compensation framework to be legitimately

established, we assume that the number of contributors exceeds the number of participating landowners
(i.e.,

I c 0).
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to contribute. The existence of rp0 in equation [2] implies the amenity program has been
implemented, thus T'replaces T in equation [1]. In this case, fPo enters directly as an element
of Po = ( rp0, Pz). For each contributor, rp represents a contributor's willingness to pay (WTP),
which we assume is equal to her maximum WTP for improved forest amenity provision.
Furthermore, for all o , fPo can be interpreted as that point along the budget line that is just
f

equal to the marginal rate of substitution between T' and z. In both equations [ 1] and [2], the
contributor gains utility at a decreasing rate from increases in r: q, and m0-rp0 (refer to Table
1 ).
If we model the contributor's preferences from the perspective of the third party using
random utility theory (McFadden 1 98 1 ), there will be elements that the contributor is aware of
but that have not been revealed to the third party. The third party will need to account for this
discrepancy and can do so through the inclusion of a stochastic term with elements of the
contributor's preferences that can be measured (the following borrows from Hanemann 1999,
pp. 35-48):

[3]

•

u( ) represents the deterministic or measurable component of the contributor's direct latent
utility associated with a particular state j (j = 1 , . . . ,J) and Eoj is the random error term. It is
important to model the preferences of the contributor from the perspective of the third party
and with a stochastic term for two reasons. First, if the forest amenity program were to be
implemented, the third party would need to know the manner in which forest amenities enter
into the preferences of a contributor and the extent of aggregate willingness to pay. Second, if
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Table 1
Expected signs and interpretations for equations [ 1] - [20]
framework

m

the amenity compensation

Expected Sign

Interpretation

au,JaiJI'' > o, &u,JaiJI''2 < o
au,Jazo > 0, &ujazo2 < 0
au,Jaqo > 0, &u;!aq/ > 0
8vo/8mol > 0, &v0/8mo? < 0 §
8vo/8 rpo/ < 0 §
8vo/8Pol < 0, &vo/8po? < 0 §
8vo/8X0[ > 0, &vo/8xo/ < 0 §
8v0/8qo/ > 0, &v0/8qo/ > 0 §

Diminishing marginal utility of forest amenities to contributor o

a v;ar · > o; & v;aT '2 < o
a v;aL > o; & v;aL2 < o

,.

Diminishing marginal utility of the composite good
Strictly increasing marginal utility with increases in goods attributes

Diminishing marginal indirect utility of income for contributor o

Indirect utility will decrease with increases in the contribution amount
Strictly decreasing indirect utility with increases in goods prices

Diminishing marginal indirect utility of goods consumed under program I
Strictly increasing marginal indirect utility with increases in the attributes

of goods consumed in program I

Diminishing marginal value to third party g of providing additional
hectares in the forest amenity program

Diminishing marginal value to g of providing added support to all other

programs

8 T '/8 Wg > O

Level of forest amenities under the compensation program increases with

increases to the budget of g

8T '/88> 0; &T '/88 2 < 0

Level of forest amenities increases at a decreasing rate with increases in

av;a8 < o; &v;ad- > o

Indirect utility for g decreases at an increasing rate with increases in the

av;awg > o; &v;aw/ > o
avg !a'¥ < O
aO* ;awg > o
80*/iftv < 0
aO* ;ar < o; &0* ;ar2 > o

the compensation price paid by g to

i

price paid to participating landowners
Strictly increasing, indirect marginal value of supplemental contributions
Increasing transaction costs associated with the amenity program

diminish the indirect utility g derives from supporting the program

Increases in contributions will lead to an increase in the price paid to

i for

hectares enrolled

Compensation paid to i by g decreases with increases in program related

transactions costs
Per unit compensation price decreases at an increasing rate with increases
in the aggregate number of hectares enrolled in the program

a7i;Ja8 > o

Participating landowner profit is an increasing function of the price paid

a!i;!a/; > o; &!i;la/;2 < o

Timber harvesting initially increases landowner profit; after some point,

for forest amenities h

additional harvesting degrades the site to the point that remediation costs

87i;l8d; > 0; &!i;lad/ < 0

are incurred
Decreasing marginal returns to profit are realized from additional passive
rent generating activities; this occurs due to the carrying capacity of the
land being exceeded (i.e., too many activities degrade the site)
Landowner profit increases at a decreasing rate with increases in the
number of hectares enrolled in the program; results from the direct
relationship between area (ha) and costs associated with forest amenity

a/;laa; ? o

management
Ecological and environmental conditions have diverse and factor specific
effects on the amount of timber harvested by i

Improvements in timber attributes (e.g., higher valued species) will
increase

i' s profit

The environmental ethic of i may or may not influence the amount of
timber harvested

Similar to the above, the amount harvested by i may or may not be

responsive to i's hurdle rate

A functional dependence exists between passive rent generating activities

and timber harvesting; the sign would be determined by the management
actions of each

i
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Table 1 (continued)

Expected Sign
at ';fafi ? o

Interpretation
Timber harvesting will be necessary in some cases to enhance forest
amenities (e.g., harvesting to increase scenic beauty) and in other cases it
will have deleterious effects (e.g., harvesting in riparian areas)

at;lae1 > o
(e; > e;)

The stronger i's environmental ethic, which includes personal beliefs on
land stewardship and the importance of sustainable forest management,
the more likely

i will

enroll in the program (given that i's ethic is at least

as strong as some threshold level, below which i would choose not to

§

For all / programs;j,j'

e

/.

participate)

the third party assumed that it could measure all significant elements of the contributor' s
utility and designed the program around this assumption, deviations from its expected
contributions would threaten the viability of the program. A drawback to the above random
utility representation of contributor preferences is that the third party cannot model the
influence of each contributor' s actions on the behavior of the other contributors, which is the
standard form for analyzing private provision of continuous public goods (Varian 1 992, p.
420; Hanley et al. 1 997, p. 44).
Given the random utility (RU) theory framework, the contributor will seek to maximize
direct utility from forest amenities, given by equation [3], subject to a budget constraint:

Pojlj+ Zoj

[4]

= mo

where the price of the composite good is normalized to one and income is constant across all
states J. Restrictions placed on equations [3] and [4] under RU limit the contributor to
purchasing only discrete quantities of lj, 1j = lj ,or T, where in the latter case no price is paid,
and enjoying increasing levels of forest amenities as long as the level of the composite good is
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nonzero (i.e., weak complementarity holds). If the contributor chooses state} � which includes
T� then the indirect utility she derives from improved forest amenities can be written as

[5]

where v(•) on the right hand side represents deterministic indirect utility and

&

captures

stochastic elements in utility associated with state j.
Suppose instead that the contributor decides to remain at the status quo state j (Ij = 1),
which does not include improved forest amenities. The contributor will do so only if the
indirect utility from j is greater than the utility fromj 1 :

>0

=0

<0

if
if
if

&oj ' - &0j < V0j - Voj'

&0j' - &0j = V0j - Voj'

&oj' - &0j > V0j - Voj'

[6a]
[6b]
[6c]

Equations [6a] and [6b] contradict equation [5], where the contributor chose j ' because it
provided the greatest indirect utility. Equation [6c], then, is the only response that coincides
with the preferred statej 1 and can be written more directly as

[6c' ]
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However, since c is a random error term and because the third party does not know ex ante the
true preferences of the contributor over the possible bundles, the third party estimates the
probability that the contributor will choose } 1 over j. Given equation [6c'], the probability of
choosing between two mutually exclusive states j 1 andj is given by

[7]

If we assume a linearly additive indirect utility function, the deterministic component for
state j 1 in equation [7] becomes

[8]

where Xor is a vector of independent variables from equation [5] and tPo' is a vector of
parameters measuring the influence of each variable on contributor utility. Equation [8] gives
the utility of the maximizing contributor when she chooses state / = (1}� zj1 with prices Por =
( rp0, Pz) and attributes qr, subject to a budget constraint. Finally, substituting equation [ 1 9] into
equation [ 1 8] specifying a specific distribution (typically Wiebull) to the stochastic term, the
contributor willingness to pay (i.e., contribution amount) (/Jo * is given by

[9]

where t/J, is the parameter estimate for income.
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2.2. Value Maximization: Third Party

A third party is defined to be a conservation-guided, intermediary institution with the
administrative infrastructure capable of collecting and dispersing funds and information with
some degree of efficiency. The inclusion of an intermediary body in the compensation
framework is necessary for three primary reasons. Foremost, third parties, such as non-profit
organizations, are value and not profit oriented, which is a more consistent preference
structure when the provision of public goods is the issue. A third party is distinguishable from
governmental bodies (although this may not always be true), an important distinction in the
case of using private lands for public goods provision. That is, private landowners and
contributors may not participate if they believe there is some connection between their efforts
and increasing regulations on private lands. Third, since contributors are mostly familiar with
the organizational framework and objectives of intermediary institutions, transactions costs for
the proposed forest amenity program may be lower than if the program was implemented
privately or federally.
The basic value structure of a third party depends on maximizing societal value of its
programs, given a budget balancing condition between contributions and operating costs.
Assume in the present case the third party implicitly derives value from the total number of
hectares funded through the forest amenity program (T') and all other programs (L):

[ 1 0]
;

where g indexes the third party.9 Equation [10] can be explicitly represented by a CobbDouglas functional form:

9 We index the third party because it is possible to have more than one party facilitating the transfer
of donations from contributors to landowners. The case of forest certification is a good example.

38

[ 1 1]

where A is a constant of value. A Cobb-Douglas form was selected to model contributor
preferences for several reasons. Namely, this function has positive but diminishing marginal
values of T' and L (8V/8T'> 0; ff VI8T' 2 < 0; 8V/8L > 0; ff VI8L2 < 0), permits the marginal
value of T' to increase with contributions (ff V!aT' 8Wg > 0), and the elasticity of marginal
value with respect to all other programs is less than one (Max and Lehman 1 988). Moreover,
the exponents can be interpreted as the shares of the third party's value allocated to T' and L.
The third party maximizes equation [ 1 1 ] given a budget balancing condition10:

w.g = L+ 81'' + "'r ,. 0

= V\.
�!C)
1

[ 1 2]

*

where W is the aggregate level of donations or alternatively, the budget size ( rp e Wg;

*
rp =

Lo f/Jo • ), o is the average price per unit of forest amenity (i.e., ha) paid to participating

landowners, 'I' is a parameter measuring transaction costs associated with administering and
monitoring the program in each region

r, K represents

the landowner' s amenity management

intensity, and the price for L has been normalized to one. Following Kant (2000, 2003),
transactions costs 'I' are strictly positive and vary across regions due to different
socioeconomic conditions in each region. Equation [ 12] can be interpreted as the participation
constraint for the third party, where the program will be administered only if the costs (righthand side) are less than or equal to aggregate contributions. Note that the third party sums
vertically the willingness to pay of each contributor when setting o since all contributors
consume the same amount of forest amenities. The compensation price o is constant across
10 We assume the third party realizes income solely from contributions.
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forest amenities h but varies with the intensity of amenity management pursued by the
landowner. For example, a landowner could decide to either designate a 30 m riparian buffer
(implying a restricted management zone) and plant tree seedlings within the buffer or simply
leave a 10 m buffer. The landowner would be compensated an amount � · (� ' = ,� + � ; ' e
(0, 1 )] for the additional effort.
By substituting the constraint (equation [12]) into the objective function (equation [ 1 1 ])
and solving the first order condition for T'we obtain

T' * = a(W- 'l'r) I �

[ 1 3]

Equation [ 1 3] implies that the optimal number of hectares funded by the third party for forest
amenity management is a decreasing function of the price paid to participating landowners
(BT' */ 8�< 0) and an increasing function of the budget size (BT' */ BW> 0). These results are
consistent with a priori beliefs about the relationship between variables (see Table 1).
Applying the result from equation [ 1 3], the indirect value the third party derives from
providing the amenity program and all other programs is given by

[ 14]

where v is the indirect value function, p is a vector of prices for all other programs L, and all
'

other terms defined earlier. The basic properties of v(•) are satisfied in equation [ 14 ], that is,
v(•) is non-increasing in program costs and non-decreasing in contribution receipts (refer to

Table 1 for additional interpretations). Given that the third party faces strictly positive costs
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----

for providing the programs, it will maximize equation [14] over 8, "'' and p subject to the
budget constraint in equation [12]:

[ 15]

Max A [a(W - 'l'r)/b]a[(1 - a) (W - 'l'r)] 1-a
t5, w.p >> o

where 'I' and p have been normalized to one. The first order conditio� for 8yields

[ 1 6]

8* = a(W- 'I')

Equation [16] gives the minimum price 8* at which T'* would be the value maximizing choice
for the third party. The price is consistent with a priori expectations that the minimum price
paid to participating landowners will increase with increases in the budget (88*/8W > 0) and
decrease with increases in program related transactions costs (88*/8'!' > 0). Dividing equation

[1 6] by T'* yields the minimum, per unit (ha-1) price, which decreases at an increasing rate
with increases in the number ofhectares enrolled in the program (see Table 1 ) .

11

2.3. Profit Maximization: Participating Landowners

We extend Birch' s (1996) definition of a non-industrial, private forest landowner to
include any individual that owns at least two hectares of land that contain a minimum forest
stocking of 0.7 square meters of basal area on at least 20 percent of the property and that does
not hold any wood production facilities. A landowner is considered a participant if the third
1 1 A utility-based behavioral model, similar to that applied to the contributor, could have been used
to analyze landowner reactions to the amenity program. However, in our compensation framework,
landowners are paid to provide an improved set of forest amenities. Faced with the opportunity to earn
income on a service once provided for free (passive provision), or possibly at a loss (active provision),
landowners have an incentive to supply a level of amenities that will generate the most income. Thus, a
profit maximization framework seems appropriate.
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i

I I
. II

party endorses his forest amenity enhancement plan, which is prepared by an approved forest
manager, and agrees to follow this plan for a set number of years. In order to simplify the
analysis and make the end result more tractable, we make the following assumptions. First,
the market for forest amenity provision is competitive such that one landowner cannot unduly
influence the price received or aggregate quantity supplied of forest amenities. Second, each
landowner is constrained in the management activities he undertakes, whether for timber
production or amenity enhancement, by the ecological capacity of the land. We assume that
landowners do not account for the management actions of other participating landowners
when choosing a profit maximizing level of amenity provision (except for the case of
landowner collaboration in connecting adjacent parcels). This assumption seems reasonable
given the high information costs associated with each landowner obtaining information on all
other participating landowners and then using that information to update his management plan.
Finally, we assume that the set of possible management plans (�) from which landowner i
selects the profit maximizing strategy can be written as:

-

-

�(z, g I e) = {(zi, gi ,Ji, di, t/ ) I zi = zi, gi = gi, ei, t/ � 0 }

[1 7]

where z is the quantity of land owned by i, fixed at z;, g denotes the ecological capacity of the
land, held fixed at gi = gi, e is a measure of the landowner's environmental ethic, Ji denotes
quantity (e.g., thousand board feet) of stumpage available for harvest, di denotes passive rent
generating activities (such as hunting leases), and t/ is given by a convex production function
and represents the aggregate number of hectares dedicated to amenity management by i under
the program. t/ is a feasible element of any management plan selected by a landowner based
on evidence that amenities influence the forest management activities undertaken by an owner
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(Binkley 1 98 1 , Max and Lehman 1 988, Dennis 1 989, Birch 1 996, Lee 1 997, Schaberg et al.
1 999, Scarpa et al. 2000).
Similar to the contributor and third party analyses, landowners face participation
constraints. Principally, landowners will participate in the program if the benefits from doing
so are greater than the benefits derived from some other set of management activities:

O*t;' + p;m; ' > p;m;

[ 1 8]

where m ' and m are feasible management plans (m � m e Y;) and p is the price received for
each plan. The constraint in equation [ 1 8] could also be interpreted as the price that
compensates owners for the difference between what they could have made selling timber on
an optimal economic rotation versus a longer rotation that includes forest amenities. A second
participation constraint is embodied in the environmental ethic of the landowner, where we
would expect to observe higher rates of participation among landowners with stronger feelings
towards stewardship and sustainable forestry (see last row of Table 1 ). This constraint is based
on research that shows a significant relationship between the environmental ethic of a
landowner and participation in an incentive based program (Kurtz and Lewis 1 98 1 , English et
al. 1 993, Weaver 1 996, Luzar and Diagne 1 999) and decisions regarding management
activities (Bliss and Martin 1 989, Bliss et al. 1 997).
Given the above assumptions and constraints, a participating landowner will maximize
profit from the sale of timber, rents generated through passive activities, and hectares
dedicated to the enhanced provision of forest amenities:
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where p is a vector of market prices,

B denotes the agglomeration bonus, a denotes a vector of

ecological and environmental conditions specific to the property (e.g., soil composition and
slope), s denotes a set of timber attributes (e.g., species and volume), f3 denotes the hurdle rate,
subscripts f and d on p denote prices of standing timber and passive activities, respectively, h
denotes the number of hectares dedicated to the management of a specific amenity (e.g.,
scenic beauty), and c denotes activity costs. 12 The costs associated with providing t/ include
both transformation (combining physical inputs to provide improved amenity outputs) and
transaction (third party verification and assessment) costs (Kant 2003, p. 43). These costs may
be significant and greater than the benefits of program participation if the landowner pursues
simultaneous management of timber and nontimber outputs across large tracts of forestland
due to complex spatial coordination problems (Swallow and Wear 1 993). Regarding the
agglomeration bonus

B, only adjacent landowners that agree to collectively manage their

adjoining parcels according to a single management plan qualify (see Parkhurst et al. 2002).
The variables measuring the influence of site specific factors on timber productivity and the
passive rent generating capability of the land are expected variables for this type of function.
However, the inclusion of an environmental ethic term is an important distinction from
previous models (Newman 1 987, Hellsten 1 988, Newman and Wear 1 993), excepting Binkley
( 1981 ), because it directly enters into the decision calculus of the landowner. The functional
dependence of passive rent generating activities and amenity management on timber
harvesting (and vice versa) implies that the activities are not mutually exclusive. We cannot

12 An obvious limitation of this model is the assumption of a linearly additive functional form,
which assumes separability and perfect substitutability between factors. Kant (2003) raises this issue as
a shortcoming of standard neoclassical approaches to modeling complex, interrelated and inherently
nonlinear ecological processes. Our only defense is that this simple (and somewhat over specified)
model is intended to emphasize the multitude of decision variables an everyday forest landowner might
take into account and a possible, simplistic strategy that owner may apply when allocating efforts across
activities.
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say, a priori, if the sign of the relationship between the sets of terms is positive or negative
since that result would seem to be landowner specific (see Table 1).
Applying Hotelling's lemma to equation [ 1 9] and evaluating the profit function at the
optimal compensation level ( 8* from equation [ 1 6]), the net supply function for private
provision of forest amenities is given by:

[20]

The result from equation [20] is optimal in the sense that it maximizes a participating
landowner's profit, given that contributors are contributing an amount that maximizes their
utility and the third party is allocating contributions to maximize the social value of its
programs. However, inherent in any model of private provision of public goods is free-riding,
which causes the solution to be inefficient and suboptimal (Myles 1 995, pp. 279-284, Hanley
et al. 1 997, p. 45). Thus we can only state that equation [20] is a second best solution possible
within the outlined compensation framework.

3.

Model Discussion
Forest amenities represent a unique set of public goods and include carbon sequestration,

soil stabilization, and wildlife habitat. Private landowners are responsible for a significant
share of forest amenities, yet many are unaware of the potential to improve their provision.
Current assistance programs and incentive schemes are designed to inform landowners and
share the costs of implementing amenity-based management plans, but are either marked by
limited funding or have not been fully developed. Thus, we construct a compensation
framework to demonstrate the dependence of society on landowners and landowners on
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society and the interaction that must occur in order for landowners to recognize the
significance of their property in forest amenity provision.
The results given in equations [9], [16], and [20] imply four potential solutions for the
efficient provision of forest amenities within the compensation framework. First, if
contributors are not willing to pay (i.e.,

rp0 * = 0) and landowners are not willing to manage for

improved forest amenities (t/ = 0), then T 1 * = 0 and the solution is simply T (the current level
of amenities). However, if contributors are willing to pay but landowners are not willing to
manage, then equation [9] does not hold and the solution is inconsistent. In other words,
landowners are not acting as profit maximizers. This result also represents a disconnect
between contributors who demand increased forest amenities and forest landowners who
collectively control the supply of amenities. If landowners are willing to manage for improved
amenities but contributors are not willing to pay, the efficient level cannot be met. The
approach of Comes and Sandler ( 1 996, pp. 24�343) to the private provision of public goods
provides an interesting interpretation of this outcome: if landowners provide some improved
level of forest amenities and this is an increase in endowment to others and forest amenities
are a normal good, additional contributions may result (depending on the shape of the Nash
Cournot reaction functions). Thus, if landowners are willing to take the first step and show
their commitment to improving forest amenities, then regardless of initial contributor behavior
the supply of amenities will approach T 1 *. Furthermore, it is possible for landowners to
improve the current level of forest amenities without compensation; this result would rely
heavily on the environmental ethic of the landowner. Finally, if landowners are willing to
manage for improved forest amenities and contributors are willing to pay, the optimal level is
satisfied (T = T 1 *). 1 3 Figure 1 provides a map of all four possible solutions.

13

We again stress the significance of free-riding in undermining the optimality of this solution.
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Contributor

Unwilling to
pay
Willing to
pay

Landowner
Unwilling to
Willing to
manage
manage
T
T'* < T
(T > O; T ' * = O)
(T, T ' * > 0)
Inconsistent

T= T ' *

Notation: T= current level of forest amenities; T ' * = optimal level of forest
amenities with the compensation program, conditional on inefficiency effects
of free-riders.

Figure 1
Potential solutions for the provision of forest amenities.

The above solutions are dependent on a number of assumptions, such as utility and profit
maximization as agent objectives, but most importantly on a belief system. An individual will
contribute to the forest amenity program if she believes her contribution will improve the level
of amenities by some measurable amount. 14 Likewise, a landowner will participate if he
believes land management activities can increase the level of forest amenities and the
compensation for such actions is at least

as

great

as

the costs. A third party acts as the

mediator between the two agents and will do so if it believes cooperation is possible, its
budget balancing condition is satisfied, and social welfare will be improved. This belief
system is characterized by high information costs in that each agent forms their belief on
verifiable information that an outcome more favorable than the status quo (T ' > T) is possible.
Decades of research in natural resource management show demonstrably that proper land
management practices can improve the quality of forest ecosystems and the level of forest

14 This response ignores the possibility of contributing based on a "warm-glow" feeling the agent
may achieve through the act of giving.
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amenities. However, transferring this information in a format the average contributor and
landowner can understand is a significant task.
The compensation framework could be extended to include the belief system through
expected utility and profit models. For example, we could assume agents seek strategies that
have the greatest probability of returning positive profit or greater utility (Kant 2003).
Additionally, the effects of imperfect information, nonuniform agents, and different attitudes
toward risk (i.e., risk averse or inclined) would be worthwhile extensions to the framework.
Modeling non-convexities in amenity production is another feasible extension. Calish et al.
( 1978) and Swallow et al. ( 1990) show how management objectives, such as managing for
different types of wildlife, and forest policies are sensitive to the assumption of convex
production functions. The authors provide detailed examples and mathematical expressions
showing that biological functions of a forest ecosystem should only be modeled by function
specific non-convex production functions; by not modeling the process in this manner, the
effectiveness of the objectives and policies could be compromised. Non-convexities can be
incorporated in the present framework by allowing compensation (equation [ 1 6]) to depend on
the type of forest amenity h managed by i. Additional improvements include modeling the
influence of one contributor's contribution on another contributor's utility and similarly, the
effect of the level of amenity production chosen by one landowner on another's behavior.
Changes in the assumption of competitive supply conditions is a possible extension, given that
70 percent of forest land in the U.S. is controlled by less than 1 0 percent of landowners (Birch
1 996).
One of the more promising extensions of the framework involves incorporating contributor
willingness to pay (WTP} information obtained through stated and revealed preference
nonmarket valuation methods, such as choice modeling (CM) and hedonic pricing. CM
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involves the creation of a hypothetical market through surveys in which participants select a
preferred policy from a collection of policies. Each policy is defined by the same set of
attributes, including a cost term, but different attribute quality (cost) levels. The random utility
model is used to explain the respondents' choices and is consistent with several limited
dependent econometric procedures, namely multinomial and mixed logit models, which
enable estimation of equation [9]. The hedonic price method (HPM) <;ould be used to uncover
the marginal implicit prices of each contributor for forest amenities by analyzing their housing
choices. The HPM relies on a different utility theoretic and estimation procedure than CM,
thus providing a richer picture of the contributor's WTP. 15 The combined application of these
methods to estimate WTP is important to the compensation framework because our
subsequent analyses of third party and landowner behavior, .and ultimately, the supply of
forest amenities, rely on equation [9].

4. Conclusion
Forest amenity management is an integral component of sustainable forest management
that has not yet been widely promulgated in landowner assistance programs. The
Environmental Quality Incentive Program and the Forest Land Enhancement Program
specifically address forest amenities by providing guidance and cost-share assistance to
landowners in exchange for management that improves amenities, restores damaged
ecosystems, and promotes long-term forest sustainability (USDA 2003). These and related
programs are limited in their funding and technical resources, consequently discouraging
many landowners from participating or simply leaving landowners unaware of the

1 5 Combining revealed and stated preference valuation techniques has become an important research
method because of the gains in information and reductions in uncertainty surrounding true WTP
(Cameron 1992, Adamowicz et al. 1 994, Adamowicz et al. 1 997, Earnhart 2001 ).
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opportunities. However, there are examples of programs such as the Conservation Reserve
Program and Wildlife Habitat Improvement Program where positive outcomes result because
landowners are informed and given equitable incentives. We believe these two elements are
the key to success for any program designed to improve forest amenity provision.
The framework we develop for improved forest amenity provision is based on incentives, a
conservation-guided third party, and a belief system. The framework explicitly incorporates
forest amenities in the utility and profit functions of contributors and landowners who have
voluntarily agreed to participate in a program administered by the third party. We show that if
each agent acts rationally on his or her preferences for forest amenities, a compensation
amount can be derived that would lead to a higher level of amenities. The framework accounts
for the environmental ethic of each landowner by modeling participation as an increasing
function of a landowner's commitment to stewardship. The concept of cooperative landowner
management is also incorporated because in some cases, such as endangered species,
cooperative management may be the only feasible strategy to pursue. The weaknesses of the
framework include high information requirements, convex functions in amenity production,
and a profit maximization model for landowners. Addressing these issues and incorporating
the results from stated and revealed preference studies are the focus of future research.
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Part 3

Information Effects in Choice Modeling: A Spatial and Aspatial Case Study
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This chapter is a slightly revised version of a paper by the same name to be submitted to the
journal Land Economics by Aaron R. Wells and Donald G. Hodges. My use of the word "we"
in this chapter refers to my co-authors and myself. My primary contributions to this paper
include ( 1) development of the problem into a work relevant to my study of environmental
valuation, (2) incorporation of geographic information systems and remote sensing, (3) most
of the gathering and interpretation of the literature, (4) econometric models, (5) most of the
analysis, and (6) most of the writing. . . . . . .

Abstract
This study evaluates the effect of forest land cover and information about future land use
change on respondent preferences and willingness to pay for alternative hypothetical forest
amenity enhancement options. Respondent choices among 1 1 options were modeled in
correlated coefficients, panel random parameters logit model. Land use change information
and the amount of forest land cover significantly influenced respondent preferences, choices,
and stated willingness to pay. Hicksian welfare estimates ranged from $57.42 to $25.53,
depending on policy specification, information level, and econometric model. These results
provide further evidence of choice sensitivity to constructed market framing and indicate a
role for GIS and remote sensing in stated preference research.

Keywords: Stated preference, GIS, Remote sensing, Information effects, Mixed logit

1.

Introduction
The basic premise of any study investigating information effects within a constructed

market posits the context jn which a decision is made affects the outcome and changes in
context should yield different outcomes (Randall et al. 1 983). Typically, changes are
exogenously induced by the researcher in hopes of testing a hypothesis about expected
consumer behavior. A standard hypothesis given in the literature states the probability a
consumer will choose to pay for an environmental good, conditional on new positive
56

information introduced into the market setting, will increase relative to the control market,
assuming all other aspects of the market remain the same (Munro and Hanley 1 999).
Correspondingly, stated willingness to pay for the good should increase (Cummings et al.
1 986). This hypothesis has been modified by several researchers to analyze consumer choice
conditional on different levels of information (Poe and Bishop 2001) as well as information
regarding possible uses of the valued good (Bergstrom et at. 1 990), substitute and
complementary environmental goods (Whitehead and Blomquist 1991 ), and resource quality
(Blomquist and Whitehead 1 998; Hoehn and Randall 2002). Additionally, the effect of too
much information (Bergstrom and Stoll 1 990) and respondent effort to obtain more
information (Berrens et al. 2004) has been tested within the information effects framework. To
date, though, the standard hypothesis has not been extended to the analysis of consumer
behavior when information about future urbanization that could reduce both quality and level
of the environmental good is introduced into the constructed market. Moreover, the hypothesis
has not been extended to investigate the effects of spatial land cover information on
respondent preferences and stated choices.
The information effects hypotheses we tested are divided into aspatial and spatial
categories differentiated by the source of the underlying data and the source of the effect yet
linked by a common respondent. For the aspatial test, the data are generated by market
participant attributes, choices, and choice characteristics while for the spatial test, data are
objectively generated by measuring the amount of forest land cover around each participant.
The aspatial information effect is researcher controlled and implemented by simply
augmenting the control market with new, potentially negative information. The information
;

we introduce informs the respondent of the possibility a hypothetical 50-acre tract of forest
land in their area will be converted to a residential subdivision. Regarding the spatial
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information effects test, we hypothesize that the amount of forest land cover surrounding a
respondent is an element of the respondent's information set and changes in the amount of
forest cover, due to land use change, for example, influence her decision making process. The
source of the information effect for the spatial test is exogenous to the researcher and instead
determined by each respondent's discrete housing choice. Collectively, we econometrically
test each information effects hypothesis with generalized nonlinear probability models.
The constructed market setting for investigating these information effects is a survey
administered by mail to 3000 residents in 2 counties on the Cumberland Plateau in Tennessee.
The basis for the survey is an assessment of preferences for current forest amenity levels,
proposed (hypothetical) changes to these levels, and willingness to pay to secure such
changes. The survey was designed consistent with the stated preference method of choice
modeling, and correspondingly, random utility theory, and consists of 5 choice sets with 3
options within each set. One option always remains the same with 1 0 alternative forest
amenity enhancement options presented to the respondent over the course of the survey. We
employed choice modeling, as opposed to contingent valuation, because this method permits
evaluation of multiple management options (plans) within a single instrument. From an
econometric perspective, the additional variability in choice attributes and choices per
respondent improves estimation efficiency and applicability of results. Relatively few studies
have applied stated preference techniques for forest amenity valuation. A review of this
literature shows an interesting division in that most of the earlier studies employ the
'

contingent valuation method (Walsh et al. 1 990, Hanley and Ruffell 1993, Macmillan and
Duff 1 998) while many later studies apply choice modeling or another form of conjoint
analysis (Adamowicz et al. 1998, Hanley et al. 1998, Schaberg et al. 1 999, Baarsma 2003, Xu
et al. 2003).
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2.

Random Utility Model
We specified a random utility model to explain respondent behavior for forest amenities as

well as to test for the effects of land use change information and surrounding forest land cover
on participant choices and willingness to pay within the constructed market. The basis of
random utility theory is the division of latent utility an individual derives from a given bundle
of goods and services into two components, one which the researcher is able to measure and
the other capturing unobservable elements. The combination of these two terms permits the
development of a probability model for individual choice which, given certain distributional
assumptions, can then be applied over all choices and individuals in a limited dependent
variable econometric model. Following Hanemann (1999),

[1]

where Uijr denotes latent direct utility individual i derives in state j at time t from composite
good x, which is not state dependent, forest amenity quality e as specified by the researcher,
the amount (m2) of forest land cover I around an individual, and individual specific
demographic attributes z. In a choice modeling based constructed market, subscript t denotes
choice sets or collections of alternative policy options with similar attributes but varying
attribute quality levels. The specification of time indicates the panel nature of the data
generating process in multiple choice set, constructed markets. The additional term I is unique
to this study and captures the influence of environmental setting that is exogenous to both the
researcher and the respondent. The right hand side of equation [ 1 ] represents the indirect
;

utility i derives from e, I, and z, in addition to net income y, and E is an econometric error term
that provides a measure of the unobservable or unmeasured factors that influence utility. The
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indirect utility term in random utility theory is commonly referred to as the systematic
component since it is observable over all choices and given a linear functional form:

[2]

where h is a vector of choice specific attributes that change with t and w is a vector of
individual specific attributes that do not change with t.
Choice modeling provides a measurement framework consistent with random utility theory
in that multiple options are evaluated by each respondent and the option chosen is revealed
preferred to all other feasible options. Since we observe the option chosen, options not chosen,
choice specific characteristics, and individual specific attributes but cannot observe or fail to
measure other factors influencing choice, a probabilistic model based on random utility theory
can be constructed to investigate the likelihood that an option will be selected. Accordingly,

1tjt(j =

1 I w, M) = 1tit {
= 1tit {

where

1t

Uijt >
u*

U;kt I M }

j :t:. k;j, k E

S

> vIM}

[3 ]

denotes the probability function, w represents choice variant and invariant

characteristics, M denotes the information content in the survey,

u*

denotes difference in

indirect utility between preferred state j and state k, v captures differences in error terms
between states, and S denotes all states available to individual i. Equation [ 3] states that
individual i will choose state j at time t if latent utility derived in this condition exceeds that in
any other state k. For example, when deciding upon which forest amenity enhancement plan to
support an individual evaluates several alternative plans but ultimately chooses only one.
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Given that

u*

is unobservable, the mean and variance of

u*

are not identified and the

researcher must impose a specific distribution to the error term. If we assume

u

to be

independent and identically distributed over time for each individual and to follow a Type I
extreme value distribution, then equation [3] can be empirically modeled by the multinomial
logit model (MNL):

[4]

Elements in w that do not change across choices must be interacted with an alternative specific
constant in order for the model to be identified. Subscript t is irrelevant in equation [4] since
the MNL treats each choice made in each choice set as from separate individuals, even though
the same individual made multiple discrete choices within a single survey. Estimates of J3 from
the MNL are assumed known and constant across all survey respondents. Since this may not
be the case such that J3 varies across the sample of respondents, a random parameters
specification of the mixed logit representation of choice (equation [3]) may be more
appropriate. Specifically, a panel specification of random parameters logit (PRPL) may be
preferred in order to capture individual specific effects across choice sets.
Within the PRPL framework, choice probabilities are based on the MNL probability
function (equation [4]) yet account for multiple choice sets with index t and explicitly model
the randomness of parameters throughout the sample via the mixing distribution f(J310).
Accordingly,
T

;

rctRPL(j = I

I w, M, t) = f I1 exp(h,J/3/ + Wj/fJ;} I r..Ss= l exp(hst'Pt + Wst'f3t )f(f3 1 O)d/3
t= 1

61

[5]

where a specific distribution for f{PI9) is determined by the researcher, for example, normal,
and e denotes parameters for the mean and covariance of the chosen distribution (Train 2003).
Equation [ 5] states the probability a respondent will choose choice j across choice sets T is the
product of multinomial logits integrated over all possible values of p. PRPL probabilities are
computed numerically using simulation methods for specified values of e
R

T

J
ntRPL(S)(j = I I w, M, t) = R- {2: n 1tjt(/Y ) }
r= I

[6]

t= I

where R is the number of simulated draws. Simulation of equation [ 6] progresses by drawing a
value of p from the mixing distribution f{PI9) in iteration

r

and estimating the multinomial

logit component of equation [5] with this draw. The process is repeated for number of draws R
with the average of such draws representing the simulated probability. By construction,

ntRPL(SJ an unbiased estimator of ntRPL and has variance inversely related to R (Train 2003, p.
1 48). Since

ntRPL(SJ is strictly positive, the log of equation [6] exists which allows estimation

of the simulated log likelihood function

N

K

SLL = L 2: l;k lnntRPL(SJ

[7]

i= I k= I

where I is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent chose k and zero otherwise.
Parameters for p including a direct effect and standard deviation, which measures the
variability of each parameter throughout the sample, are estimated by maximizing equation [7]
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with respect to p. Computed variances for each direct effect and standard deviation permit
hypothesis testing of direct effects and fixed (constant) coefficient values for the sample.

3. Survey and Data

A multiple choice set, discrete trichotomous choice survey, or constructed market,
designed accordingly to the choice modeling framework (Louviere et al. 2000) was used to
assess public preferences for forest amenities. In particular, the goal of the survey was to
evaluate the feasibility of developing a framework in which nonindustrial, private forest
landowners would be compensated for managing their lands for improved forest amenities.
Three thousand choice surveys were mailed to residents in Morgan and Cumberland counties,
located on the Cumberland Plateau in central Tennessee. This location was selected because
the Plateau provides a number of resource use conflicts between new residents, recreationists,
and extractive industries such as mining and logging, that threaten the sustainability of the
forest resource. Additionally, both counties are experiencing population growth rates
exceeding the national average of 1 .3 percent (SSDAN 2000), with Cumberland experiencing
an annual rate of 3.4 percent and Morgan 1 .4 percent. In line with population growth, these
counties have experienced increased conversion of forest and agricultural land to urban uses
(Strickland 2003). Urbanization is not localized to our study area and has been found to be a
primary driver for land use change throughout the South (Wear 2002). Due to increasing
population and urbanization, which underlie present resource conflicts in our area, we found it
relevant to investigate how public preferences for forest amenities might change if we
informed residents of the possibility of further land use change.
;

We introduced the constructed market to respondents through two cover letters and a
survey, with the letters explaining to the respondent forest amenities, the role of private
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landowners in forest amenity supply, and how the respondent's answers to questions in the
survey could help improve future levels of forest amenities. Within the survey, this
information was reiterated and new information was provided explaining the layout of the
survey, payment vehicle, and policy relevance. We informed respondents that the survey was
not a means to justify additional taxes or introduce new legislation but instead a way for us to
gain a better understanding of public preferences and values for forest amenities in the area.
The payment vehicle was specified as an annual, voluntary contribution for five years to a
non-profit organization that would then use these donations to fund initiatives providing land
management assistance to private landowners. 1 6 We presented the compensation mechanism
as a means of helping landowners who manage their land do so in a manner that provides the
most public benefits and for landowners that do not manage their land, the incentive to do so
and in a socially desirable way. The extended time frame of five years, as opposed to the
standard one or two years, was necessary to allow sufficient time for forests to respond to
management activities.
The layout of the survey included 5 choice sets with 3 generic (i.e., non-labeled) options
within each set. These options were described to the respondent as alternative forest amenity
enhancement plans a hypothetical, representative landowner in the study area would
implement if compensated for doing so. If the respondent chose the status quo (Plan A), then
the landowner would not manage her property for improved forest amenities and the stock of
amenities would remain the same. However, if the respondent chose either forest amenity
I

enhancement Plan B or C then the landowner would implement the selected plan and use the
16 To improve incentive compatibility, a payment vehicle such as a sales or property tax (Tennessee
does not have an income tax) could have been applied. However, at the time of survey design and
administration the Tennessee State Legislature approved a sales tax increase that resulted in some areas
paying an approximate 10 percent sales tax on purchases. Due to the strong objections of residents
toward this increase and the desire to have a reasonable response rate, we elected to use the less
incentive compatible payment vehicle of private contributions.
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respondent's contributions to offset management expenses. In total, a respondent evaluated 1 1
alternative forest amenity enhancement plans with each plan decomposed into 4 amenity
attributes (recreational access, scenic beauty, stream quality, and wildlife habitat) and a
voluntary contribution. The forest amenity attributes were assigned one of three quality levels,
Low, Medium, or High, and in the case of the voluntary contribution, one of four levels ($20,
$35, $50, $75), according to a fractional factorial design algorithm�(see Appendix A). 1 7 The
status quo was presented to the respondent as Low for recreation, scenic beauty, and wildlife
habitat, Medium for stream quality, and zero contribution. We include a status quo option
since forest amenities, as defined in the survey, will continue to be provided regardless of the
program. Figure 2 provides an example choice set presented to survey respondents.
In order to test the effect of information about future possible urbanization on public
preferences and stated willingness to pay (WTP) for improved forest amenities, we designed
two versions of the survey identical in all respects except the specification of the choice
scenario. In the control version, the representative landowner is described to the respondent as
owning 50 wooded acres comprised of both hardwood and evergreen tree species and several
streams, approximately 1 0 miles from a major interstate ("no development" specification). In
the experimental version, we describe the same landowner (50 acres, 10 miles from interstate)
but introduce information that she has been approached by a residential developer to sell the
land for a future subdivision. Additionally, we state that the representative landowner would
forgo this development option if compensated for providing forest amenities. Thus, we
exogenously alter the available information set and if the respondent reads and comprehends
this new information then we should observe an effect on preferences and stated WTP,
compared to the control.
;

17 We identified quality levels by these simplistic terms after discovering through focus groups that
more detailed quality level descriptions overloaded the respondent with information. Contribution
levels are based on actual costs given in Dubois et al. (200 1).
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SCENARIO 1
Note: Please refer to the Definitions page to clarify unfamiliar terms.
Reminder: Choose one Option that has your favorite quality levels (in the middle) and the

amount you are willing to pay.
The "Annual Contribution" represents your willingness to pay annually for S years
in the form of a voluntary contribution to fund the Option you select.
Directions: Choose either Choice A, Choice B, or Choice C at the bottom of the set.
Option 8

Option C

ALTERNATIVE

ALTERNATIVE

LOW

LOW

LOW

Stream Quality

MEDIUM

IDGH

HIGH

Scenic Beauty

LOW

LOW

MEDIUM

Wildlife Habitat

LOW

MEDIUM

IDGH

Annual
Contribution

$0.00

$20.00

$35.00

Option A

Please respond by checking (...J ) the option that you most agree with and
that you can afford with your present budget:

I prefer Option A

I prefer Option B

Figure 2
Example choice set from Forest Amenity Improvement Survey.
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I prefer Option C

Based on these two survey versions we conducted several focus groups and a pre-test
mailing of 100 surveys. Principal findings from these meetings and initial surveys include the
following: forest amenity attributes and quality levels were overspecified (too much
descriptive information), too many choice sets (originally 7), and unreasonable maximum
payment level ($320). After taking into consideration these findings, 2000 surveys were
mailed to Cumberland County and 1 000 to Morgan County followi'ng a three-phase Dillman
design (Dillman 2000). The first phase consisted of a short cover letter informing the potential
respondent of the upcoming survey. One week following this letter, a full cover letter and
survey were mailed; a post card reminder was sent two weeks post the second phase. A second
mailing of the survey was not undertaken as we did not believe the expected increase in
response rate would justify the additional cost. The unequal division in survey mailings across
counties was due to prior knowledge of inadequate mailing address information in Morgan
County. 1 8 All addresses were generated by random digit dialing procedures by Survey
Sampling, Inc and used to georeference each respondent.
Table 2 provides descriptions for variables adapted from the choice modeling instrument
(see Appendix B for an overview of all survey questions). Most of the variables are standard
to choice analysis with the exception of Knowledge and Plan

Score. Knowledge is a measure

of the respondent's perceived knowledge of forests and trees as measured by their choice of a
score between zero and five, with five indicating complete knowledge and zero indicating no
knowledge. We assume a direct relationship between increases in

Knowledge and the

probability a survey respondent will choose a forest amenity enhancement plan (option). The

Knowledge question was presented to survey participants after evaluation of the choice sets.
Plan Score is an aggregate index capturing the total effect of each enhancement plan in each
;

18

We have also conducted a hedonic price analysis of housing prices and forest amenities in these
two counties and found significant gaps in address information for Morgan County. A principal reason
for this data gap is the lack of a well-developed 9 1 1 emergency response system.
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Table 2
Variable identification and descriptive statistics based on respondent answers to Forest
Amenity lm�rovement Surve_y
Variable

Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

1 if respondent lives in Cumberland County;
0 if Morgan County
Median number of acres of forestland owned
by respondent (derived from six land size
categories ranging from zero to 1 00 acs or
more)

0.753

0.43 1

9.7 1 8

1 9.814

Respondent's selection to the following: "How
would you rate, on a scale ofO to 5, your
knowledge of forests and trees"

2.805

1 . 108

Natural log oftotal amount (m2 /1000) of
deciduous and evergreen forest land cover
within a 1OOm radius of each respondent

1 .501

1 .205

1 if Status Quo information contains
Development option; 0 ifNo Development
option
Aggregate score for each forest amenity
enhancement plan (status quo Plan A and
alternative Plans B and C) across choice sets 1
through 5 presented to the respondent; log
scores were calculated for each attribute level
to avoid linearity assumptions and then
summed across attributes for each option;
score ranges from 0 (status quo) to 3.99
(highest level of forest amenities)
Annual dollar amount respondent is voluntarily
willing to contribute for five years for the
enhancement plan chosen; ranges from 0
(status quo) to $75; contribution amounts vary
independently across respondents and assigned
to each plan by the researcher according to
actual cost of implementation
Alternative specific constant 1 for both
contribution options (i.e., forest amenity
enhancement Plans B and C); 0 if status quo
o tion

0.440

0.496

2.069

1 .093

25.000

22. 1 38

0.667

0.471

Demographic Variables

Cumberland

=

=

Land Size

Attitudinal Variable

Knowledge

Spatial(GIS/RS) Variable

Forest Cover

Survey Design Variables
Develop

=

=

Plan Score

Contribution

Contribute ASC

=

=

;
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choice set on preferences. We indexed forest amenity attributes and associated quality levels
due to high levels of multicollinearity. 19 The index was computed by first assigning orderpreserving values of one through three to quality levels Low, Medium, and High, respectively,
and then summing these levels over all forest amenity attributes within each plan and choice
set:

A

L qaJt

[8]

= Plan Score11

a=I

where q denotes quality levels,

a denotes forest amenity attributes (recreational access, scenic

beauty, stream quality, or wildlife habitat), j indexes individual plans, and t indexes choice
sets. Equation [8] represents a simple linear combination of attributes and attribute quality
levels and implies the effect on respondent preferences of a change from quality level Low to
Medium is equal to a change from Medium to High. In order to avoid this result we computed
several transformations of equation [8] including quadratic, exponential, and logarithmic.
Each of these transformations specifies a nonlinear relationship between respondent utility and
increasing attribute quality levels, which yields a more theoretically consistent depiction of the
importance of quality levels to a respondent. We employed each transformation in
combination with the remaining regressors in the econometric analysis of choice and found the
exponential transformation of

Plan Score to be insignificant and the logarithmic

transformation to provide the best model fit.

;

19 The minimum and maximum Pearson correlation coefficients between any two attributes were
0.04 and 0.94, respectively, with both mean and median value approximately 0.64. A complete matrix
of correlation coefficients is available from the authors. The multicollinearity is a result of relaxing
orthogonality between attributes and quality levels in the design phase.
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4. Information Effect: Forest Cover
Within the context of environmental valuation research, remotely sensed imagery and
geographic information systems have been predominant in revealed preference studies
(Bateman et al. 2002). Examples include Dubin (1 988), Can ( 1992), Geoghegan et al. ( 1997),
Mahan et al. (2000), and Kim et al. (2003) in the hedonic literature and Bateman et al. (1 996)
in the travel cost literature. The advantage of a spatial perspective is that it allows researchers
to investigate the relationship between preferences and surrounding environmental conditions
and how this relationship might change when conditions are altered. More importantly,
welfare measures, such as compensating variation, are conditioned on preferences for
environmental settings and failure to address this linkage may result in biased welfare
estimates. This in turn would affect policy formation, choice, and evaluation.
The constantly increasing computing capability, advancements in geographic information
systems, and more readily available, high resolution remotely sensed imagery enable
researchers to integrate spatial variables in valuation models. Stated preference research
inherently involves a spatial perspective and until recently, has been ignored. Farber and
Griner (2000) incorporate a distance measure with stated choices to investigate the influence
of proximity to affected streams on willingness to pay for improvements to these streams.
Results suggest stated willingness to pay decreases with increasing distance (implying a
distance decay effect) for stream users while no such relationship exists for non-users. Their
work represents the first study to incorporate a GIS derived variable in a choice modeling
"

context. In a contingent valuation study of protecting forests from increased flooding,
Bateman et al. (2000) find a significant distance decay relationship between willingness to pay
and respondent distance from the site under valuation.20 GIS and remote sensing, though,
20 Sutherland and Walsh (1 985) and Pate and Loomis (1997) each find a significant distance decay
relationship between stated willingness to pay solicited in contingent valuation experiments and
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provide for more advanced treatment of space in valuation models than simple distance
measures, as indicated by the aforementioned hedonic pricing studies. In the spirit of the
advancements made in revealed preference research, we explore the role of forest land cover
on preferences and willingness to pay using a methodology similar to Geoghegan et al. (1997).
Unlike states such as Maryland, the state of Tennessee has not yet developed a
comprehensive, digital land cover classification. Thus, we developed a 12-class land cover
classification for the Cumberland Plateau using Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics satellite
imagery (30-m resolution) provided by the USGS, digital orthophoto quadrangles (resampled
to 1 m resolution), and the GIS Imagine. Digital data were supplemented with ground data
collected throughout the study area to facilitate pixel classification and accuracy assessment.
The general process involved a series of supervised classifications based on 400 individual
signatures with an overall accuracy of approximately 90 percent (see Strickland 2003 for a
complete methodological review). Survey responses were linked to the land cover
classification by first geocoding each respondent's address. We then developed a program in
the Arclnfo macro language to place a l OOm buffer around each respondent's geocoded
location, intersect this buffer with the land cover classification, and then sum over all
categories. Finally, the category for forest land cover was selected for further analysis with the
respondent's stated choices, demographics, and attitudinal responses (see Table 2 for variable
description and descriptive statistics). We hypothesize that the amount of forest land cover
around a respondent does influence choice, thus we should observe a significant parameter
estimate for the variable Forest Cover.

distance to the valued good. However, in the former study GIS was not applied in distance calculations
and in the latter no reference was made to the derivation of their distance measures.
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5. Information

Effect: Land Use Change

The random utility model specified in equations [32] through [34] provides a framework
for exploring the conditional probability an individual will choose one of the forest amenity
enhancement options described in the constructed market. Specifically, we are interested in
the effect of information concerning the

possibility of land use change from forest to

residential.2 1 The information provided to a respondent may not affect choice for several
reasons: he/she did not read or understand the choice scenario, has preconceived views that are
unaltered by new information, or believes the information to be erroneous and thus ignores it.
When information is neutralized, we would expect the probability of choice to be independent
of the information content in the survey such that Jt(j = 1 I N) = rf(i = 1 I D) = 1t(j = 1 ), where
N denotes the no development scenario information and D the development information.
However, theory and applied research shows that the probability of choice is conditioned on
information such that the equality does not hold (see Munro and Hanley 1 999).
This result gives rise to four possible outcomes that are contingent on both the level of
information and the respondent's held beliefs. To explore these four cases, two separate
random utility models with an expected utility dimension were specified:

Jt(j = 1 I w; N) = rt{ v(y - C,

and

I

rf(i = 1 lw; D) = rt { v(y - C,

e, I, z)' + E' > v(y, e, I, z)Q + EQ I N }

[9]

e, I, z)' + �>' > o[v(y, e, I, z)Q + E� + 9[v(y, e, I, z)v+ Ev] ID} [ 1 0]

21

It is possible that the development information had the effect of creating two separate goods forest amenities without development pressure and forest amenities with development pressure, instead
of an information effect. A debriefing question was not included in the survey to help distinguish
between the two potential types of effects, thus we cannot be sure of the dominant effect this
information had on respondent preferences.
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where j denotes a forest amenity enhancement option (Plan B or C),

C denotes positive

contribution to the forest amenity program, 1>'(. ) ' indicates indirect utility derived from a forest
amenity enhancement option,

v(.)Q represents indirect utility from the status quo, v(f

represents indirect utility given the development information, 8 and 9 are individual specific
measures of risk with (1 - 8) = 9 and 0 < 8 < 1 , and individual and time subscripts suppressed
for notational convenience. Equation [9] does not include the additional component included
on the right hand side of equation [10] because under the no development specification, there
is no other land use to consider. For the following cases, assume the perspective that an
individual is responding to the development specification, that is, equation [10].

CASE /
If the respondent does not prefer residential development, then v(. )D represents the
disutility an individual derives from the change and

v(.)Q > v(f. Thus, the probability of

choosing a forest amenity enhancement option will be greater under the development than no
development information; we expect to observe a higher proportion of choices for an
enhancement option from the development compared to no development responses. The
testable null hypothesis is H1:

rrf>(j = 1

I w; D) > rc"(j = 1 I w; N). This outcome is not sensitive

to the value given 8, but an interesting analysis arises under different risk assumptions. For
more risk averse respondents, 9

> 8 implying more weight assigned to the unfavorable

outcome development, we would expect to observe a greater proportion of choices for the
enhancement option than if respondents were risk inclined (8

> 9) . If our survey had been

designed to measure individual risk behavior, we could have stratified the analysis of choice
and scenario specification by attitude toward risk to test these expectations.
;
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CASE II
In contrast to CASE I, it is reasonable to· believe that some individuals will perceive
development as a positive alternative land use due to the potential welfare improving impacts
of increased labor demand for home construction, increased property

tax

revenue,

opportunities for business development, etc. That is, respondents would view residential use
of the land as the highest valued and best use. In this case, v(f > v(.)Q, reflecting the utility an
individual gains from the knowledge that the area will be converted to residential use.
Accordingly, we expect to observe a lower frequency of choices for a forest amenity
enhancement option with the development specification of the status quo over the no
development specification. The null hypothesis is HII:

Jt(j = 1 I w; N) > rr?(j = 1 I w; D).

As

before, specific values for o would only change the distribution of choices and not the overall
outcome.
CASE lli
Respondents may not prefer to see the land use change from forest to residential but at the
same time perceive forests to be unsafe because, for example, of a potential wildfire threat.22
Consequently, they are indifferent to the development information in the description of the
choice scenario. In this case, v(.)Q = v(.)D and regardless of risk behavior v(.) Q+ FP

=

o[v(. )Q+

EQ ] + 9[v(.)D + E� holds. Thus, we would expect to observe identical proportions of choices
across the two scenario specifications with null hypothesis Hm:

rr?(j = 0 I w; D) = Jt(j = 0 I w;

N), wherej equal to zero indicates choice of the baseline or status quo (i.e., Plan A).
I

22

Aggregating across both survey versions, 60 respondents ( 1 6% of total) stated that wildfire was
the most significant threat to the future of Tennessee forests (as compared to urban/commercial
development, chip mills/forest industry, and lack of State funding).
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CASE IV
Last, if respondents prefer the status quo regardless of the information given in the scenario
v
specification then v(.) = 0 (or o = 1) and v(.)Q > v(.)' in both equations [9] and [10]. This
result implies that in either information setting respondents will choose the status quo option
more frequently than a forest amenity enhancement option. Thus, the null hypothesis is H/1/:

�,N(j = 0 I w; M) > �,N(j

=

1 I w; M).

While Cases II through IV are immediately solved by the result for Case I, the contingency
table applied in the analysis of I (Table 3) offers interesting insight into these potential
outcomes. As an econometric test of an information effect, we tested the null hypothesis that
the coefficient for dichotomous variable Develop (f3v) is not significantly different from zero
(indicating no effect). The alternative hypothesis is that the development information will be
perceived as negative by respondents and serve as an incentive to choose a forest amenity
enhancement option (i.e., Case n. Accordingly, we expect to observe f3v > 0. Finally, we
derived estimates of compensating variation to test whether respondent stated willingness to
pay is different between the development and no development information specifications of
the choice scenario. The testable hypothesis is Ha: cVV > cJI'I.

6. Results
6. 1. Survey Respondents
Of the 3000 surveys mailed across 2 counties, 372 useable surveys were returned with 122
undeliverables, yielding a response rate of approximately 1 3 percent. While this rate is low
compared to more traditional contingent valuation exercises it is within the range reported by
;

previous studies employing a similar multiple choice set, choice modeling approach
(Adamowicz et al. 1 994, Farber and Griner 2000). Thirty percent of all choices (N = 1 860)
75

Table 3
Conditional independence tests for choice by specification of choice scenario and land
ownershipa
,

Choice
Hypothesis Specification

Status Quo

Choice scenario

No Development
Development
Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel x2(df = 1 )"

9.2 1 *

Land Ownership
Less than 5 ac
More than 5 ac

Forest Amenity
Improvement

345 (33%)b
216 (26%)

700 (67%)
599 (74%)

380 (28%)
1 8 1 (37%)

990 (72%)
309 (63%)

14.99*
Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel x2(df = 1)
• Conditional testing was also conducted by stratifying by county, gender, and land ownership with qualitative

results consistent with those reported.
Percentages in parentheses are calculated by dividing each cell value by its respective row total.
c Testing H0: No association between specification and choice; • indicates significance at the 0.01 level.

b

were for the status quo (Plan A) payment level of zero,

23 percent for contribution amount

$20, 29 percent for contribution amount $35, and the residual 1 1 and 7 percent for
contribution amounts

$50 and $75, respectively. Qualitatively, these results suggest that there

is not a spike at either end of the contribution distributio!} and thus protest and yea-saying
effects should be minimal. Analysis by county shows that Cumberland County recorded the
greatest number of returned surveys with
Morgan County recorded

279, representing 1395 individual choices, and

93 returned surveys with 465 choices. Relative to the number of

surveys mailed to each county, Cumberland County reported a

14 percent response rate and 9

percent for Morgan County. The lower response rate for Morgan County was expected given
its more rural status and may lead to a response bias in subsequent econometric modeling. A
check for possible nonresponse bias was conducted via a short telephone interview with

100

randomly selected survey nonrespondents. Qualitative analysis of these results shows that on
average nonrespondents were of similar age, held like attitudes toward forestry, and owned
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approximately an equal amount of land, yet were less educated and held lower household
income when compared to respondents.23 Thus, a potential response bias may be evident in the
data.
Table

3 provides a contingency table of respondent choices by specification of the choice

scenario. Analysis reveals that

67 percent (n12

=

700) and 74 percent (n22

=

599) of choices

from the no development and development survey versions, respectively, were for one of the
alternative forest amenity enhancement plans (i.e., non-zero contributions). Based on a
Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel chi-square test of conditional independence between choice and
specification of the choice scenario, the null hypothesis of no association was firmly rejected
(p-value

< 0.001). Thus, Case I in Section 3 represents the behavior of respondents to the

development information. That is, respondents to the development specification of the choice
scenario viewed this information negatively, or received disutility from the potential land use
change, which then corresponded to a higher frequency of choices for an alternative to the
status quo. As mentioned earlier, the result for Case I provides an immediate solution to Cases
II through N but further analysis of Table

3 reveals that a significantly lower proportion of

zero contributions were stated by respondents given the development survey version (see Case
III). Overall, these results indicate the significant influence researchers can have on
respondent preferences and stated choices by simply altering the information set provided in
constructed markets.

;

23 In total, 53 1 nonrespondents were randomly selected for the telephone administered nonresponse
analysis. However, due to a variety of reasons, namely immediate refusal to participate in the telephone
survey, only 1 00 surveys were completed. The most frequently reported reasons for not responding to
the mail survey included: participants did not feel qualified to complete the survey (n = 16) and had no
interest in forest amenities (n = 1 8). Least frequently reported reasons included budget constraints (n =
7) and survey was too long and complicated (n = 8). As a note, nearly two thirds of surveyed
nonrespondents resided in Morgan County while for the sample of mail survey respondents three
fourths resided in Cumberland County. A copy of the nonresponse interview form and complete
analysis of the nonresponse component of this study are available from the authors.
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6.2. Econometric Analysis

Results of multinomial logit (MNL) and panel random parameters (PRPL) model
estimation of the pooled 372 completed surveys representing 1860 options chosen and 3720
options not chosen are listed in Table 4.24 Since the PRPL model estimates the probability an
individual will choose one of the forest amenity enhancement options (Option B or C) for each
alternative, all of the information in the sample is applied in estimation. Accordingly, 5580
observations are applied in ML and only 1 860 in MNL estimation. We present the results of a

MNL model to illustrate the significant differences in preference modeling that can result if an
inappropriate econometric model is applied to panel data generated within a discrete choice
framework. As can be readily seen, all variables were significant and have one directional
impact on the probability of choice in the MNL model while only 3 variables were significant
and of one direction in the PRPL model. The policy implications of these inconsistencies are
apparent and highlight the importance of searching out the most appropriate econometric
representation of choice. The model fit is also greatly improved by modeling choice with the
panel random parameters logit model, as indicated by the more positive log likelihood value
and substantially higher value of McFadden's R2 • We apply results from the PRPL model for
further analysis.
Similar to Revelt and Train (1998) and Train ( 1998), we believed certain variables would
not explain choice independent of the others. Empirical model testing revealed that the
coefficient for Contribution Amount was highly correlated with several variables, namely Plan
•

Score. Logically, these two variables should move in a similar direction as it is infeasible to
achieve a higher level of forest amenities without increasing the cost of provision. In order to

24

A likelihood ratio test was conducted to test parameter (and preference) equality of respondents
across the two survey versions. The null hypothesis H0: -/' = of was not rejected at any level (where y is
the vector of estimated parameters from the no development (N) and development (D) only samples;
full estimation results are available from the authors).
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Table 4
Multinomial logit and panel random parameters (PRP) logit model coefficients for choice
among forest amenity enhancement options
Multinomial Logit
Variable

PRP Logit (Corr. Coeff.t
Std. Dev.

Coeff.

Coeff.

0.552
(4.524)b
-0.01 1
(-4. 1 98)

-3.37 1
(1 .200)
-0.005
(-0.044)

4.048
(0.747)
0.292
(2.810)

0.244
(5.148)

0.836
(2.06)

1 .373
(1 .267)

-0. 1 10
(-2.098)

-0.251
(-0.455)

2.686
(2. 105)

0.45 1
(4. 143)
0.506*
(6.594)
-0.025
(-9.208)
-0.923
(-3 .948)

0.7 1 7
(0.642)
0.573
(3 .347)
-0.045
(-13.470)
4.252
(1 .253)

7.177
(2.385)
0.9 14
(9.333)
0.000
(7.972)
12.764
(2.0E+3)

Demographic Variables
Cumberland

Land Size

Attitudinal Variable

Knowledge

Spatial (GIS/RS) Variable

Forest Cover

Survey Design Variables

Develop

Plan Score
Contribution
Contribute ASC

lnL(9)
Chi-square (df)
McFadden's R2

Nd

-1939.91
1 85.04 (8)
0.05
1,850

-1 596. 1 2°
872.62 (38)
0.2 1
5,580

• Based on I 000 Halton sequences; normal distribution is specified for all coefficients; estimated in Limdep.

b

Asymptotic /-statistic in parentheses.

d

Ten observations with missing information.

c Simulated log likelihood value at convergence.

;
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account for this interaction and other correlated variables, we report results of the PRPL
specification with correlated coefficients. The PRPL model allows for multiple choices per
person, yet spatial, attitudinal, and demographic attributes of each person remain constant
across choices. In order for the model to be identified, these variables were interacted with

Contribute ASC. All of the interaction terms except Cumberland were found to significantly
influence choice and only Knowledge was found to have a one-directional impact on choice
(Table 4) . The coefficient for Knowledge is positive indicating perceived knowledge of forests
and trees, and presumably, forest amenities, has a positive influence on the probability a forest
amenity enhancement plan will be chosen. The insignificance of the standard deviation of

Knowledge indicates this result held for all respondents. The marginal effect for Knowledge
was also positive and implies that increasing perceived knowledge by one level increases the
probability an enhancement plan will be chosen by 44 percent (see Table 5). These results
suggest through improved education and outreach efforts (i.e., extension) residents in the
study area may be more willing to support land management efforts that lead to improved
forest amenities. If support did increase, landowners might have a viable alternative to
preserve or enhance their forested holdings in the face of increasing development pressures.
Restricting attention to the coefficient column of the panel random parameters logit model,
the insignificance of the mean coefficient value for Forest Cover suggests that there is no
spatial information effect. However, since the PRPL model explicitly incorporates in
estimation the randomness of the coefficient throughout the sample, measured by the
;

coefficient's standard deviation, we fmd that the amount of forest land cover surrounding
survey respondents does significantly influence their choice. A reason for the lack of
significance in mean coefficient value for Forest Cover is the countervailing effects of the
variable on respondents' decision-making process (Train
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1998). For 54 percent of respondents

,

Table 5
Coefficient distribution and marginal effectsa
Variable
Land Size
Knowledge
Forest Cover
Develop
Plan Score
Contribution
Contribute ASC

Distributionb

Marginal Effectsc

(5 1 -, 49 +)
N.A.
(54 -, 46 +)
(46 -, 54 +)
(27 -, 73 +)
(0 -, 1 00 +)
(37 -, 63 +)

N.A.
0.439
N.A.
N.A.
0.283
-0.268
N.A.

�

• Based on coefficients from the panel random parameters logit model in Table 4. Notation N.A. pertains to

coefficients that do not vary throughout the population (Knowledge) or do not have a significant mean parameter
estimate (Land Size, Forest Cover, Develop, and Contribute ASC).
b The negative sign following the first value in each parentheses indicates the percent, or share, of respondents for
whom the coefficient has a negative effect on the predicted probability of choosing a forest amenity enhancement
option. Similarly, a positive sign indicates a positive effect on predicted probabilities. The distribution for each
coefficient is calculated by constructing a standard normal deviate with the coefficient value and its respective
standard deviation and then computing the probability of finding a value greater than the result (assuming standard
normal distribution).
c Each marginal and partial effect measures the change in the probability an individual will choose one of the forest
amenity enhancement plans (Plan B or C) given a change in the respective variable. Marginal effects are computed
for each respondent and then averaged. We report the estimates for Plan C, which are nearly identical to those for
Plan B.

forest cover negatively influenced their decision to choose a forest amenity enhancement plan
while the influence was positive for 46 percent (Table

5). Based on respondent comments to

the survey and the fact that the mean number of forested acres owned by respondents was
approximately

10 while only 26 percent were landowners, the negative influence is driven by

landowners in general and specifically, owners who would not manage their land for improved
forest amenities if given the option. In order to statistically test this hypothesis we constructed
an indicator variable separating landowners (Land Size >

5 ac) and non-landowners and then

analyzed the frequency of choice by ownership category (Table

3). Similar to the earlier test

of conditional independence for respondent choice by specification of the scenario, the results
reveal significant association between forestland ownership and choice. The evidence against
;

the null hypothesis of no association suggests landowners are less likely to choose a forest
amenity enhancement option and more likely to choose the status quo compared to non-
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landowners.25 Since forest landowners are surrounded by more forest land cover than nonlandowners, we can tentatively conclude that responding landowners control the sign and
distribution of the Forest Cover coefficient. Thus, a one directional affect cannot be
determined and more weight lies in the negative tail of the distribution for Forest Cover.
The results for the coefficient distribution of Land Size nearly mirror those of Forest Cover
and provide further evidence that owning land is a negative factor in the decision to contribute
to improved forest amenities. For 5 1 percent of respondents, owning more land negatively
influenced their choice of a forest amenity enhancement plan. However, by identifying and
investigating the 49 percent of respondents for which land ownership positively influenced
choice we may be able to identify a common set of factors that explain the relationship.
Incorporation of this information in extension programs to landowners could improve the
effectiveness of such programs and potentially increase landowner support for improving
forest amenities.
The insignificant mean value and significant standard deviation for the Develop coefficient
indicates that land use change information does affect respondent preferences and stated
choices but not in a one directional manner. The new information was perceived as a potential
detrimental outcome and served as an incentive to choose a forest amenity enhancement plan
for 54 percent of respondents (supporting Case 1). However, for the residual 46 percent the
new information was perceived as providing potential positive benefits and thereby served as a
disincentive to choose an enhancement plan (Case II). The distribution of the Develop
•

coefficient provides evidence in support of the aspatial information effects hypothesis (Ha: f3v

> 0), yet the large proportion of respondents for whom the information was perceived in a

25 Landowners could have tended to choose the status quo more often than one of the forest amenity
enhancement options because they already have a sufficient level of forest amenities. Thus, they are
content with the status quo. The general result of choosing the status quo, though, does not exclude the
possibility that landowners may be willing to manage their land for improved forest amenities.
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positive light precludes broad generalization. Referring back to earlier discussion of the
multinomial and panel random parameters logit models, if the MNL was the sole econometric
model for analyzing choice we would have concluded strongly in favor of the hypothesis Ha:
f3n > 0. This result, while generally in the right direction, would have implied that all
respondents assign identical weight to the land use change information. The information
gained from estimating PRPL models minimizes such generalized" and possibly inaccurate
conclusions.
The mean coefficient value for the variable measuring influence of aggregate forest
amenity enhancement quality (Plan Score) on respondent preferences is highly significant and
positive indicating that forest amenities collectively have a positive affect on choice.
Additionally, the standard deviation is highly significant with the overwhelming majority of
respondents (73 percent) preferring improved forest amenities. The marginal effect for Plan
Score indicates that a one unit increase in the aggregate level of amenities increases the

probability of choosing an enhancement plan by 27 percent. These results imply respondents
prefer forest amenities and are willing to contribute to improve amenity supply. Comparison
of the coefficient distribution for Plan Score and respondent land ownership yields an
interesting correspondence between the number of responding landowners (98 or 26 percent)
and the 27 percent of respondents for whom forest amenities had a negative affect on choice.
This correspondence suggests that while the minority of survey respondents are landowners,
they collectively control the physical supply of forest amenities (and coefficient distribution of
Forest Cover) and are generally not in favor of undertaking management activities to improve

them. A disconnect is clearly present between demand, represented by respondents that
;

support enhanced forest amenities, and supply. Progress toward the improvement of forest
amenities is contingent upon resolution of this issue, which in turn depends on increasing

83

landowner knowledge of forest amenity benefits and development of additional compensation
mechanisms.
The negative and highly significant mean coefficient for Contribution accords with
expectations and indicates that forest amenities are a normal good. Moreover, as expected
increases in contribution levels negatively influenced the choice of a forest amenity
enhancement plan for all survey respondents?6 However, an increase in Contribution has the
smallest marginal effect (in absolute value) on the probability a respondent will choose a
forest amenity enhancement plan. The mean value of the coefficient for the alternative specific
constant Contribute ASC is insignificant but the standard deviation is highly significant. The
coefficient distribution for Contribute ASC implies that the majority of respondents (63
percent) have strong underlying preferences for an enhancement plan (Plan B or C) while only
37 percent prefer the status quo (Plan A).

7.

Implications and Conclusions
The results of econometric modeling of respondent choice between forest amenity

enhancement plans reveal the ability of researchers to influence preferences and ultimately,
choice in constructed markets. It follows that if choice is conditional on market framing then
stated willingness to pay should be as well. If WTP varied in predictable patterns based on
changes in framing, then researchers and policy makers could account on an ad hoc basis for
new information that came forward after the constructed market was administered or for
;

mistakes in the original design by simply adjusting the results accordingly. However, WTP
does not vary systematically and the direction of influence a researcher has on respondent
preferences and choices can vary through the sample such that quantifying an adjustment
26 Given that the sign of Contribution was negative for all respondents, we re-estimated the PRPL

model with Contribution specified to follow a lognormal distribution. Estimation results between the
two models are qualitatively similar.
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factor would be complicated at best. Thus, information effects on choice and stated
willingness to pay should be assessed on a case by case basis. In this study, we extend earlier
findings of spatial and aspatial information effects to evaluate whether stated willingness to
pay is influenced by new information and the amount of forest land cover surrounding a
respondent as well as the specification of the econometric mode1.27
For the aspatial information effect, we compared differences in "stated willingness to pay
across choice scenario specifications for a policy change that involved an improvement in the
current level of forest amenities from the status quo (Plan Score = 0) to a moderate level of
provision (Plan Score = 2). WTP estimates for these two policy scenarios are based on
estimated parameters from the multinomial (MNL) and correlated coefficients, panel random
parameters logit (PRPL) models. Despite theoretical and mathematical differences between
the two logit models the same equation is applied for calculating changes in WTP (Train 1998,
p. 236). Accordingly, the change in willingness to pay for an improvement from the status quo
level of forest amenities qo to q •, holding utility and all other factors constant, is given by:

cv = - 1 1Pcontribute ( y IX0 - r IX)

[1 1]

where CV i s the Hicksian welfare measure, x i s a vector that includes both choice variant and
invariant attributes, superscript o denotes the status quo, the asterisk denotes the improved
level, and y is a conformable vector of estimated parameters. The estimation of CV by
econometric model and choice scenario gives rise to four welfare estimates for the proposed
policy changes. Controlling for information effects, Hicksian welfare estimates of $25.53 and
$39.7 1 , based on PRPL and MNL coefficients, respectively, result from increasing forest

27 For this section of the analysis, we are interested in the magnitude as opposed to exact willingness
to pay for improved forest amenities.
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amenities to a moderate level (Table 6).Z8 However, evaluating the same policy change but
accounting for a situation where new information about possible future residential
development is introduced into the constructed market yields Hicksian welfare estimates of
$4 1 .50 (PRPL) and $57.42 (MNL). A statistical comparison of these four estimates shows that

the new information significantly increases CV both within and across model specifications
with the MNL model consistently yielding higher estimates (Table 6). Thus, researchers can
influence preferences, choices, and willingness to pay for environmental improvements
solicited in choice modeling based questionnaires. Furthermore, econometric model
misspecification can result in significant differences in estimated welfare impacts of
alternative policies.
The test for differences in estimated Hicksian welfare values for the spatial information
effects hypothesis was conducted by specifying the same policy change (Plan Score 0 to 2)
but assuming a five percent reduction in mean forest cover. We based this reduction on a land
use change analysis of our study area (Strickland 2003) that predicts 1 0 percent conversion of
all forested areas to developed uses between year 2000 and 201 0. Assuming a uniform
conversion rate over the sampled time period ( 1 0 years), total forest loss during the 5 year
time horizon for contributing to improved forest amenities, as specified in the survey, would
approximate 5 percent. Incorporating this reduction into the proposed policy change yields
Hicksian welfare estimates of $41 .34 (MNL) and $27.64 (PRPL) (Table 6). These estimates
are only $ 1 .63 and $2. 1 1 higher than similar estimates for a policy change with no
"

accompanying forest conversion. The closeness of these values to each other and zero
suggests that spatial information in the form of forest loss does not significantly change
individual willingness to pay for improved forest amenities. However, this result is more than
28

As a note, given the insignificance of the mean coefficient value and standard deviation of county
residence indicator Cumberland there should be no county-induced response bias on any of the
estimated welfare measures.
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Table 6
Hicksian welfare estimates by econometric model and policy scenario for improved forest
amenitiesa
Policy Scenariob
Aspatial Information Effect
Develop = 0 (or 1)
Develop = 0 vs. Develop = 1

Multinomial logit
coefficients

Panel random parameters
logit coefficients

$39.71 *
($27.48, $5 1 .94)"
$57.42*
($39.69, $75 . 1 6)

$25.53*
($1 8.43, $32.64)
$41 .50*
($32.02, $50.98)

$41 .34*
($28.88, $53.79)

$27.64
($20.5 1 ' $34.77)

Spatial Information Effect
5% reduction in Forest Cover

• * indicates rejection at the 99 percent confidence level of Ho: CV;

CJj, where i and} (i * j) index estimated
Hicksian welfare estimates, based on an asymptotic t test and the standard normal distribution. Hypothesis tests
were not conducted across information effects.
b The same policy change of an increase in Plan Score from the status quo level of 0 to a moderate provision level
2 is specified for each set of welfare estimates. In the first set, the welfare estimates are invariant to the information
effects dummy since all other factors remain constant except Plan Score.
c 95 percent confidence intervals calculated by the delta method (Greene 2000, p. 70).
=

likely driven by the proportion of responding forest landowners, who have greater mean levels
of forest cover around their residences than non-landowners and generally prefer the status
quo (and associated $0 contribution amount). If this is the case, then an alternative
interpretation of the low welfare estimates could be it is not the additional willingness to pay
that should interest policy makers or forest managers but instead the number of potential new
contributors. That is, individuals who transition over time from rural to urban as a
consequence ofland use change.
In summary, this study combined spatial data collected from geographic information

systems and remotely sensed imagery and aspatial data from a choice modeling based
constructed market to investigate information effects on stated preferences for forest amenity
improvements.

The results

show that researchers

can influence preferences and

correspondingly, choice and willingness to pay, by altering the circumstances in which
preferences are formed, choices are made, and WTP is stated. However, in both cases of
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information effects the direction of impact was not one-directional in that for a proportion of
participants influence was positive and negative for the others. This result is provided by
random parameters logit estimation of choice yet masked by multinomial logit estimation.
Information about future potential land use change served as an additional incentive to
contribute to improved forest amenities by the majority of respondents. The high number of
respondents for which development was seen as a negative incentive to contribute reflects
strong preferences for the benefits associated with urban development. Thus, the future of a
program promoting improved forest amenity management will involve educating residents of
the benefits of forest amenities and tradeoffs associated with development.
This study also found that the amount of forest land cover surrounding survey respondents
influences choice for improved forest amenities. The uniqueness of this finding is that to date
no other published study has incorporated spatial land cover information in a stated choice
framework. The addition of a spatial variable allowed us to uncover interesting results relating
increases in urbanization to potential increases in respondents willing to contribute to improve
forest amenities as well as relating forestland ownership to preferences for the status quo level
of amenities. These results support earlier findings that suggest a significant disconnect
between forest amenity demand and supply. Increasing forestry knowledge for both
landowners and non-landowners may be a promising means for aligning the disparate
interests. Future research can build on these findings by investigating the effect of less subtle
changes in market framing, incorporating additional land cover classes in the participant's
•

information set, and applying nonlinear probability models that explicitly incorporate
preference heterogeneity and panel data.
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Part 4

Toward Valuing Anthropogenic Impacts and Ecological Relationships in
Forested Wetlands Using Spatial Econometric Models
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This chapter is a slightly revised version of a paper by the same name submitted to the Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management in 2004 by Aaron R. Wells, Aaron R. Pierce,
and Donald G. Hodges. My use of the word "we" in this chapter refers to my co-authors and
myself. My primary contributions to this paper include (1) development of the problem into a
work relevant to my study of environmental valuation, (2) development of the implicit
valuation model, (3) incorporation of geographic information systems, (4) most of the
gathering and interpretation of the literature, (5) econometric models, (6) most of the analysis,
and (7) most of the writing. . . . . . .

Abstract
This study presents economic values for specific ecological relationships and negative
externalities associated with channelization that affect the productivity and overall market
value of forested wetlands. To estimate these values, we develop and apply a spatial theoretic,
implicit valuation model to microlevel ecological data in the Hatchie River Watershed, USA.
Several functional forms for both the model and underlying spatial dependence are applied in
nonparametric spatial econometric estimation of the valuation model. The results of robust,
generalized moments estimation of double logarithmic spatial autoregressive error models
(spatial dependence up to 1500m) indicate that the implicit cost of damages to forested
wetlands caused by channelization is -$5,438 ha- 1 • Results presented here are subject to the
usual disclaimer of being site specific and temporally sensitive, thus future research
investigating additional variables across differing forested wetland conditions and periods is
recommended in order to bring legitimacy to the proposed valuation model.
Keywords: Forested wetlands; Channelization; Implicit valuation; Spatial interaction

1.

Introduction
The ecology of forested wetlands, or bottomland hardwood forests, has been researched

extensively (Happ et al. 1 940, Shelford 1 954, Hosner 1 960, Keeley 1 979, Clark and
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Benforado 198 1 , Wharton et al. 1 982, Elder 1 985, Gosselink et al. 1 990, Kellison and Young
1 997, Mitsch and Gosselink 2000). Research in these areas has provided valuable information
toward appreciating and understanding the complex functions and values forested wetlands
provide such as water quality enhancement, nutrient transformation, flood abatement, wildlife
habitat, recreation, aesthetics, and wood products. Similarly, research has furthered the state of
knowledge regarding anthropogenic impacts, primarily, agricultural development, timber
harvesting, and hydrologic modifications such as channelization, on the ecological functioning
of forested wetlands (Heitmeyer and Fredrickson 1 98 1 , Hupp and Simon 1 99 1 , Hunter et al.
1993, Hoover and Kilgore 1997, Lockaby et al. 1 997, Perison et al. 1 997). However,
economic analysis of damages to and benefits of these ecosystems has been pursued to a lesser
extent.
The objective of this paper is to introduce a framework for estimating the economic value
of attributes affecting productivity and market value of forested wetlands in the Hatchie River
Watershed, USA. Specifically, we employ spatial econometric procedures and a hedonic-type
model to develop a set of implicit prices for the negative externalities associated with
channelization

and

excessive

sedimentation.

Additionally,

we

empirically

explore

fundamental ecological relationships between the value of a forested wetland and its location.
The appeal of the model we present is that it is spatial theoretic, based on a limited number of
plausible assumptions, and capable of valuing cumulative damages to forested wetlands. To
date, this damage valuation model and corresponding empirical methods have not been
;

applied to the economic analysis of forested wetlands. Previous research has focused instead
on the economic value that wetlands in general provide to society using aspatial econometric
techniques or have applied nonmarket valuation methods for more site-specific valuation
purposes (Kaxmierczak 200 1 , Woodward and Wui 200 1 ). While this research helps to
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demonstrate the dependence of society on these unique ecosystems, and more importantly,
draw attention to the significance of a diminishing supply, it does not address cumulative
damages or specific factors affecting wetland functioning on any relevant temporal and
watershed scale.
Alternative valuation methodologies that have been used to estimate damages to wetlands
include individual service valuation (Hickman 1 990), net factor incofne, replacement cost, and
energy analysis approaches as well as nonmarket techniques.29 The individual service
valuation approach assumes that the value of a wetland can be determined by first subdividing
the system into multiple, noncompetitive market-based services. For example, the benefits of
employment and higher property values associated with fishery habitat and flood abatement
services. The benefits of these services are then aggregated to derive the total economic value
of the wetland. Problems with the individual service valuation approach include potential
double counting of service benefits, focus on market as opposed to ecological benefits, and
aggregation. Despite these problems, several valuation studies have been conducted on the
basis of this method (Thibodeau and Ostro 198 1 , Thomas et al. 198 1 , Costanza et al. 1 989,
Whitehead and Blomquist 1 99 1 , Gren et al. 1 995). Wetland valuation based on the net factor
income approach relies on a direct relationship between the aerial extent of a wetland and firm
profit or productivity. Increases in wetland acreage are assumed to result in increased firm
profit, and benefiting firms are expected to be willing to pay for improved wetland services in
order to secure this additional profit. The problem with the net factor income method is that it
can only be used to measure the use values of a wetland in terms of its relationship to firm
productivity (Whitehead 1990). The replacement cost method of wetland valuation simply
29 Most of the published research in this area has focused on wetlands in general and not on forested
wetlands in particular. Thus, emphasis is placed on wetlands valuation. Additionally, alternative
valuation methods have been applied to wetlands, such as the value estimator model (Bergstrom and
Stoll 1 993) and the opportunity cost of forgone development (Batie and Mabbs-Zeno 1 985), but are not
discussed in detail here.
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measures the value of wetland services as the economic cost of the least expensive alternative
capable of achieving the same services (Bystrom 2000, Woodward and Wui 2001 ). A problem
with this method is finding an alternative that can adequately replicate the services provided
by the existing wetland resource and then gaining societal and/or (potential) damager approval
of said alternative. Lastly, the energy analysis approach to wetland valuation assumes an
ecological economic perspective in that the value of a wetland is reflected in the total work
accomplished by the wetland for society (Gosselink et al. 1 974, Farber and Costanza 1987,
Costanza et al. 1989). The usefulness of this method is limited by a number of significant
assumptions, notably, the sole value of the wetland is its energy content.

In contrast to the market and ecosystem perspectives of the above methods, nonmarket
valuation techniques are based on the values individual economic agents hold for wetlands.
Revealed preference nonmarket techniques, such

as

hedonic pricing and travel cost, are used

to econometrically estimate the value of a wetland by relying on an indirect relationship
between the wetland and individual transactions for related market goods. The values
estimated are referred to as (indirect) use values and are a measure of the usefulness of
wetlands to an individual (e.g., water filtration). Most of the revealed preference research for
wetland valuation has applied the travel cost method with recreation as the related good
(Raphael and Jaworski 1979, Miller and Hay 198 1 , Thibodeau and Ostro 198 1 , Farber 1 988,
Creel and Loomis 1 992, van Vuuren and Roy 1993, Doss and Taff 1996, Mahan et al. 2000,
Bennett and Whitten 2003). Primary drawbacks with using revealed preference methods for
;

valuing changes in wetland quality and availability include site-specific information, which
complicates aggregation, and failure to capture nonuse values of wetlands.
Stated preference nonmarket valuation techniques, such as choice modeling and contingent
valuation, utilize hypothetical markets constructed within survey instruments to directly obtain
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the willingness to pay of an individual for wetland services. These techniques have the
capability of deriving values society places on wetlands external to their role in the economy,
e.g., value of habitat for endangered species, as well as use values. The majority of stated
preference studies of wetland valuation have applied the contingent valuation method
(Thibodeau and Ostro 1 98 1 , Farber and Costanza 1 987, Farber 1 988, Bergstrom et al. 1 990,
Whitehead 1 990, Loomis et al. 1 99 1 , Lupi et al. 1 99 1 , Whitehead and Blomquist 1 99 1 ,
Stevens et al. 1 995, Pate and Loomis 1 997, Morrison et al. 1999, Oglethorpe and Miliadou
2000, Spash 2000, Bennett 200 1 , Randall et al. 200 1 , Johnston et al. 2002). A principal
argument against stated preference techniques is that hypothetical markets yield hypothetical
values, which should not be used for real world policy and project analysis, especially in the
case of unique environmental assets such as wetlands.
The model we develop adopts a revealed preference methodology, in particular, the
hedonic price method, such that the economic value of nonmarket attributes of forested
wetlands is inferred through the prices buyers are willing to pay for merchantable wood. We
assume that the values of these attributes vary across the watershed depending on their
geographic location, that is, values are not randomly assigned, thus a form of spatial
dependence or interaction is present. This dependence may help to explain variability in prices
paid for merchantable wood and ignoring such dependence may result in a misspecified model
that over or under reports the magnitude of nonmarket attribute values. We employ spatial
econometric techniques to empirically test for and explicitly incorporate the influence of
spatially interactive nonmarket attributes on predicted wood values in our valuation model.
We then discuss the results from the perspective of justifying stream and wetland restoration
efforts and improving resource management in forested wetlands.
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The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows: section 2 describes the study area,
identifies the issues, and explains the field methods; section 3 establishes the spatial theoretic
model; sections 4 and 5 provide estimation results and the implicit values; a concluding
section summarizes the research and recommends future directions for valuing damages to
forested wetlands.

2.

Study Area

2.1. Hatchie River Watershed

Our study area spans three counties (Haywood, Madison, and Hardeman) in the upper
portion of the lower Hatchie River Watershed (HRW) in West Tennessee. The HRW lies
within the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Valley (LMAV) and Upper East Gulf Coastal Plain and
comprises approximately 6,736 square km (USDA 1 986), 55,848 ha of which is bottomland
hardwood (BLH) forest ( 1 6 percent of all BLH in TN) (Schweitzer 2000). A principal river
draining the HRW is the Hatchie River, which has been designated one of 1 3 State Scenic
Rivers and one of the 75 "Last Great Places" by the Nature Conservancy. The Hatchie River is
the longest unchannelized river remaining in the LMAV, however many of its tributaries have
been channelized. Primary physical characteristics of the study area include flat topography,
seasonal and permanent flooding, soils dominated by fine wind-blown soil (loess), and an oak
hickory forest cover type.

2.2. Issue Identification

Soil erosion and excessive sedimentation are the critical issues for forested wetland
ecosystems in the HRW. Erosion typically can lead to loss of upland areas, unstable channel
bank conditions, incised stream channels, and loss of vegetation along stream banks, all
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having negative impacts on forested wetlands. Sedimentation is a normal process in wetland
ecosystems that provides several benefits including replenished nutrients and fertile soil.
Human interactions have accelerated this process, however, negatively altering functional
processes of forested wetlands, such as nutrient cycling and flood abatement. Moreover, when
excessive sedimentation is combined with changes in channel slope or debris jams, valley
plugs and alluvial fans are created. These geomorphic structures �ause increased overbank
flooding and excessive sand deposition in the floodplain. As a result, the floodplain system is
damaged in several ways including: degraded aquatic habitats, reduced flood capacity,
increased water table level, creation of natural levees, increased flooding and ponding of water
that affects the survival, growth and regeneration of bottomland hardwood tree species,
burying fertile soils with infertile sand and gravel, and increased lateral erosion (Happ et al.

1 940). Diehl (2000) has recorded over 35 valley plugs across the Hatchie River Watershed,
with two-thirds located in our study area.
Past and present land use practices, namely agricultural development and forest harvesting,
in combination with channelization, have and continue to be the driving factors behind soil
erosion and excessive sedimentation. These factors have led to erosion of the thin loess layer
of the region, exposing and eroding the coarse alluvium sands beneath, thereby resulting in
massive gully erosion. An estimated 580 million kilograms of sediment accumulates in the
Hatchie River every year (USDA 1986). One of the most significant contributors is
channelization, which refers to the straightening and dredging of a stream channel for flood
control or navigational purposes. Such alterations cause a degradation of the stream channel
and lead to channel erosion (Robbins and Simon 1983, Simon and Hupp 1 987, Simon 1 994).
Several studies on sediment dynamics in West Tennessee suggest that channelization results in
,

bed-level lowering and stream degradation (Hupp and Simon 1 986, Darby and Simon 1 999,

101

Diehl 2000). Additionally, channel alterations caused by channelization combine to increase
stream velocity and power, which enables the stream to transport and deposit increased
quantities of sediment downstream and into the floodplain (Gilvear and Bravard 1996). In the
HRW, 92 percent of the major tributaries have been channelized and since channelization of
these tributaries, the main channel of the Hatchie River has become shallower and flooding
has increased (USDA 1 986). The emphasis of this paper and corresponding valuation model is
on monetizing the impacts (or negative externalities) of channelization on forested wetlands in
the HRW.

2.3 Field Plots
In order to apply a spatial, hedonic-type model to value factors affecting forested wetlands,

a large number of field plots located across the continuum of ecological site conditions was
necessary. Accordingly, 357 fixed-radius, circular plots were established along the Hatchie
River and 5 different tributaries of the Hatchie River during Summer 2002 (Figure 3). The
tributaries were selected by degree of hydrologic impairment and access, with the latter being
the most limiting factor. Thirty three percent of the field plots were located on Federal lands
(Hatchie National Wildlife Refugee) with the residual established on private, nonindustrial
lands.
At each site, field plots were established at 50m increments along transects located 200m
apart and perpendicular to the selected tributary, with the first plot at the stream bank.
;

Approximately 40 site measurements were recorded per field plot, with each plot containing
three sub-plots defined by different radii. Within the 1m2 inner circular plot ( l m radius),
groundflora data were collected including species, average herbaceous height, and litter depth.
Species and diameter at breast height (DBH) of saplings, defined by DBH between 4 and
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Brownsville
Clover Creek

Hickory
Creek

.....�..,,, �--JWI""""f- Bolivar
A�...t!lf---- Spring Creek
Hickory _.._,.,.
Valley

* Approximate locations of study sites.
Figure 3
Map of Hatchie River Watershed and location of study streams.

and 1 0 em, species and number of both seedlings (greater than 1 m in height) and shrubs, and
average sapling and shrub height measurements were recorded in the 0.004ha circular plot
(5.6m radius). Information for all tree species greater than 1 0cm DBH, including canopy
position, total height, sawtimber height, and stem quality were collected in the 0.04 ha outer
circular plot ( 1 1 .3m radius). See Figure 4 for an example design applied in field data
collection. Additional measurements within each plot included ocular estimates of the stand
structure (even or uneven aged), stand development stage (initiation, stem exclusion, transition
or old growth), past disturbance (logging, fire, flooding, and combinations thereof),
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Field plot design for a representative site
50m

n
0 0 0 0

4

0 0 0 0

]

3

0 0 0 0

,

200m

0 0 0 0
2

0 0 0 0
Upstream

0 0 0 0
Tributary

Binary contiguity form of spatial weights matrix Z
(d;* 50m).
Field
4
1
2
3
Plots
1
1
0
0
0
=

2

I

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

Inverse distance form of spatial weights matrix Z.
Field
1
2
4
3
Plots
1
0
0.0200
0.0050
0.0023
2

0.0200

0

0.0049

0.0024

3

0.0050

0.0049

0

0.004

4

0.0023

0.0024

0.004

0

Figure 4
Example ginary contiguity and inverse distance weight
specifications for the spatial weights matrix Z, based on
the field plot design applied in the data collection phase
of this study.
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disturbance severity (light, moderate or severe) and time since disturbance (0-5, 5-25 or >25
yrs). Finally, site information such as presence of water within the plot, percent canopy cover
(determined with a site tube at plot center and from four points on the edge of the 1m2 plot),
and the number and species of logs, snags, and stumps were collected at each plot.
Collectively, all of the measured site attributes constitute microlevel data on the ecological
condition and state of forest productivity at each plot.

3.

Spatial Theoretic Model

3. 1 Spatial Ecological Econometrics: Basic Principles

The interaction of ecological and anthropogenic factors influencing forested wetland
productivity and market value across the watershed motivates the use of spatial econometric
models. To model productivity otherwise would require the restrictive and unrealistic
assumption that ecological units, defined either by research requirements (e.g., field plot) or
by the ecosystem (e.g., watershed), are unconnected or islands across the landscape. Under the
island framework, only site specific factors affect productivity at the site and cross-site
nutrient, climate, and related ecological interactions are ignored. Ecological research has
shown that this assumption does not hold (Robbins and Simon 1 983, Rossi et al. 1992,
Legendre 1 993), thus a framework that explicitly incorporates spatial interaction can be
designed based on both theoretical and data-driven reasons.
A basic spatial theoretic model of ecological interaction states that the productivity at plot i
is implicitly determined by on-site and neighboring plot attributes:

,

[1]

VieJ
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where q; is a scalar measure of ecological productivity (e.g., number of understory plant
species),

r;

is a 1 x k row vector of measured plot attributes,

s;

is a 1 x k* row vector of

unmeasured plot attributes (where k u k* = K), q_; is a 1 x k row vector of attributes defining
productivity at all plots other than i, and J indexes plots. The separation of q; into measured
and unmeasured components is necessary for ecological research since it is never practical or
feasible to collect data on all attributes affecting site productivity. The inclusion of q_; is also a
necessary addition to the spatial implicit model of site productivity and implies spatial
interaction between/among neighboring sites. This formulation (i.e., q_;) is similar to the
model of interacting agents in the public economics literature (see Brueckner 2003).
The implicit spatial interaction specified in equation [40] can be explicitly modeled
through a spatial lag or a spatial error model (Anselin 1 988).30 The spatial lag model includes
a spatially lagged dependent variable (ZQ), computed as the weighted sum of values of q at all
neighboring locations, as a separate term in the set of explanatory variables. Accordingly, the
spatial lag model for equation [ 1 ] is

Q = <jlZQ + XP + f..l

[2]

where Q is a J x 1 vector of site productivity, Z is the J x J spatial weights matrix, Q is a J x 1
vector of spatially lagged dependent values, <jl is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, X is a J
�

x k matrix of measurements on R (where R denotes measured attributes across all plots), � is a
k

x

1 matrix of coefficients and f..l is assumed to be a J x 1 vector of independent and

identically distributed (i.i.d.) error terms with mean zero and constant variance Jd-. A spatial
30 Equation [ 1 ] can also be modeled with higher order models such as spatial lag with spatial error
components or models that incorporate spatial heterogeneity through spatial regimes.
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lag model might be specified for equation [ 1 ] if theory suggested that productivity across sites
was functionally dependent on the productivity at each neighboring site.
In contrast to the spatial lag model, the spatial error specification models the spatial
interaction among sites through the error term:

Q = XP + Jl

J.1 = A.ZJ..l + e

[3]

where A. is the spatial autoregressive parameter that is jointly estimated with the other model
parameters J3, ZJ..l is the spatially lagged error term, and e is a J x 1 vector of i.i.d. error terms
with zero mean and constant variance Q (and all other terms are explained above). The error
component for Q will equal

e

if Z is nonzero for some elements and there is insignificant

correlation of unobserved site attributes across neighboring plots. In the case of a significant
spatial autoregressive parameter, the spatial error model captures the influence of both the
measured attributes R and the omitted attributes S (where S is an aggregate index of
unmeasured attributes across all plots) on the productivity at site i. Thus, in this formulation,
unobserved or unmeasured on-site and neighboring attributes play a significant role in
explaining differences in site productivity across space.
Spatial econometric estimation of equation [ 1 ] with either the spatial lag or spatial error
model depends critically on the specification of the spatial weights matrix Z. Generally, zero
elements of Z indicate islands and nonzero elements measure the weight of association
between neighbors. Formally, Z is a J x J matrix with elements zij corresponding to the
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Euclidean distance between two points i and} (denoted dif). 3 1 The diagonal elements of Z (zii)
are set equal to zero indicating that an observation is not a neighbor to itself (Anselin 2004). If
some element zif has dif > 0, then the researcher can specify a particular weight (or functional
form) to the element. Commonly used forms include binary weights (based on either first or
second order contiguity), inverse distance weights (such as the "gravity index"), and k-nearest
neighbors (used primarily in real estate analyses). For binary weights, Zif = 1 if i and} share a
common border (first order binary contiguity) and zero otherwise; alternatively, zif = 1 if i and
j are not adjacent, but through a common border with 1, are contiguous (second order binary
contiguity). Binary weights based on contiguity can also be computed for points, such as
polygon centroids, using a distance criterion. For example, two points i and} are neighbors (zif
= 1 ) if the distance between them is less than some cut-off distance (i.e.,

"
dy � dif). Inverse

distance weights for zif are computed as lldif� (t � 1) and imply decreasing association between
two sites with increasing separation. This form of spatial weight seems appropriate in
ecological research since attribute interaction will tend to be stronger with increasing
proximity. The k-nearest neighbors specification requires each zif to have the same number of
neighbors, thus eliminating islands and reducing variability in Z. Figure 4 presents two 4 x 4
spatial weights matrices Z using binary and inverse distance weights for the field plot design
employed in this study.

3.2. Spatial Ecological Econometrics in Site Attribute Pricing
..

Since ecological relationships and negative externalities associated with channelization are
by definition unpriced and hypothesized to vary by geographical location, we employ a spatial

31 Computation of spatial weights matrix Z (and hence dif) requires georeferenced coordinates for
each site. For this study, global positioning system units were used to collect the latitude and longitude
of each plot center.
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implicit econometric model to monetize site attributes. The theoretical development of the
model is based on the hedonic price method (Freeman 1 993, Rosen 1 974), whereby the effects
of ecological and anthropogenic factors are assumed to be capitalized into the market value of
merchantable pulpwood and sawtimber. Monetary values for individual site attributes are then
econometrically estimated through an indirect relationship between the market value of
merchantable wood and the attributes. A principal assumption underlying our model is that as
the quality of site attributes increases (for example, more productive soils), both forest
productivity (measured by volume ha- 1) and percentage of preferred tree species increase, and
overall, the market value of merchantable wood increases because a buyer would be willing to
pay a premium for these higher quality forests. The ecological component of this assumption
is supported by decades of research in bottomland hardwood forests (e.g., Hodges 1 997) and
the willingness to pay component follows from economic theory, thus lending credibility to
the model. Additional model assumptions are provided over the course of the next several
equations.
Given the theoretical structure presented in equation [ 1 ], spatial econometric models are
necessary in order to explicitly incorporate spatial interaction in the da ta. Ignoring this
interaction in model estimation affects the significance and magnitudes of the coefficients
(Anselin 1 988, Anselin et al. 1 996), which in our case are the basis for determining the
economic value of unpriced site attributes (namely, externalities of channelization). Thus, we
are motivated to use spatial econometric models on both theoretical and empirical
considerations.
The dependent variable in the spatial implicit valuation model is the aggregate market
value of all measured trees greater than 1 0 em diameter at breast height (DBH), in each field
plot:
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M

N

[4]
m=l

n=l

where W is the market price of wood volume, V denotes cords (fe) of pulpwood (P) and
thousand board feet (fe) of sawtimber (1), o denotes the delivered price per unit of V, i
indexes field plots, m indexes pulpwood species groups, and n indexes sawtimber species and
groups.32 The total market value W varies across plots due to different species compositions,

32 Market prices for pulpwood (DBH < 30.5cm) and sawtimber (DBH � 30.5cm) were derived from
the July-September 2002 Tennessee Department of Agriculture, Division of Forestry's Wood Products
Bulletin (WPB) (Tennessee Department of Agriculture, 2002). The WPB lists delivered timber prices
per thousand board feet (mbf), Doyle Rule, for specific species (e.g., tulip poplar), species groups (e.g.,
red oak), and a miscellaneous category, which includes boxelder and elm species. Pulpwood prices are
reported as delivered prices per cord (90 ft? of solid wood and bark per cord) and based on the general
product class "hardwood". Delivered prices are presently the only viable market data available for
merchantable wood in our study area. The alternative of stumpage prices is not feasible given limited
species-specific price information. A concern with delivered prices in our model is that we must assume
buyers implicitly value the site attributes that contributed to the growth of the purchased wood. This
relationship can be shown mathematically using a series of implicit functions. First, express V in
equation [4] as a function of q;:
'rf i e J

[5]

so that the total quantity of merchantable wood at each site (i.e., field plot) i is a function of the quality
at the site. Next, decompose the measurable component of equation [1], r;, so that it is equal to:
r; =

r(t;, y;)

[6]

where t comprises the measurable components at the site that the buyer is most concerned with, e.g.,
species, DBH, height, and overall tree quality, and y comprises all other measurable site attributes, e.g.,
canopy closure and whether or not the site is located near a channelized stream. Substituting equation
[6] into equation [ 1 ] and theri'the resulting expression into equation [5], we have:
V; = v {q [r(t;, y;), s;; q_;] }

[7]

Equation [7] now states that the quantity of wood at a site is a function of measurable attributes taken
directly and indirectly into account by a buyer, unmeasured attributes, and neighboring site conditions.
Finally, if we express the price a buyer pays for delivered timber and pulpwood (BT.l) as a function of V;
and x, a vector of non-ecological, exogenous factors that affect the individual's decision making
process, e.g., time of year (where a subscript on x denoting buyers is dropped for convenience without
changing the outcome):
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stem densities, and product mixes, which in turn is directly influenced by differences in site
conditions. Accordingly, W can be written as an implicit function of growing site attributes:

W; = w(q;)

[ 1 0]

where q; is a 1 x K vector of all on-site attributes defining quality "at plot i. We hypothesize
that W is increasing at a decreasing rate with increases in q (oW/oq > 0, ff Wioq2 < 0).
Substituting equation [ 1] into equation [ 1 0] gives W; as an implicit function of measured and
unmeasured attributes at plot i and all neighboring plots -i:

W; = w {q(r;, s;) ; q_;}

[1 1 ]

Based on the spatial implicit function given by equation [ 1 1], we can derive the marginal
implicit price of the kth measured attribute in R by partially differentiating with respect to the
element and setting the solution equal to zero. In the case of a linear functional form for
equation [ 1 1 ] , W = RP + Jl, the marginal implicit price is simply the coefficient from the
estimated regression equation:

aw; aRk = rk

[ 1 2]

8T.P = 8(V;, x)

[8]

then the following relationship can be shown:
8T.P = 8 {v[q(r(t;, y;), s;; q_;)], x}

\;;/ i

E

J

[9]

Equation [9] shows that the price an individual pays for delivered wood can be used to price t; and y;,
but at the same time delivered prices are an imperfect measure because they are more than a function of
just these two variables.
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3.3. Model Specification
The explicit form of the spatial implicit valuation model for the microlevel data on
attributes influencing forested wetland productivity and condition, and correspondingly,
market value, is written as:

LNPLOT_TOTAL; =/{[CHANNELIZED; CLOSURE; STREAM_DIST; DISTRUB;
CHAN* STREAM; ROAD_DIST; OAK; CYPRESSi]' *
[ 13]

where the relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory variables may be
nonlinear, Jl may or may not be normal, i.i.d, and i indexes field plots (see Table 7 for
explanation and descriptive statistics of each variable). Diagnostic tests for misspecification of
equation [ 1 3] are carried out based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with resultant
statistics measuring strength against null hypotheses of homoskedastic, normally distributed,
and spatially independent error terms Jl;. Additionally, informal tests for potential model
misspecification are conducted using several different functional forms of equation [ 1 3].
Homoskedasticity is checked with the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1 979), if
normality holds, and with the Koenker-Bassett test (Koenker 1 98 1 , Koenker and Bassett 1 982)
if not. In either case, robust estimation procedures, such as the groupwise heteroskedasticity
specification (Anselin 1 992, p. 220) can be used to explicitly incorporate nonconstant error
variance in model estimation. The assumption of a normally distributed error term is tested
with the Jarque-Bera test (Jarque and Bera 1 987) and if violated, maximum likelihood (ML)
and OLS estimation techniques cannot be used to estimate equation [ 1 3] because these
methods are based on normality. If the assumption of normality does not hold, the more
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Table 7
Explanation and descriptive statistics for field plot attributes by stream channel condition

6
Natural Streams
(n 224)

Channelized Streams
{n = 133}'

Variable
(Plot attribute)
PLOT_TOTAL
CHANNELIZED

Description

Mean

Market value of woody stems
( > 10 cm) ($)
= 1 if the plot is located on a
transect originating from a stream
that had been channelized; 0
otherwise ( )
Percent closure of overstory
canopy; computed as the average of
5 measurements taken at each plot
(%) (+)
Distance from stream channel to
plot center (m) (+)
Multicategory variable measuring
effect oftime since last significant
disturbance on site productivity and
plot market values; time is
measured in discrete categories, 05, 5-25, and >25 yrs, which are
interacted with severity of
disturbance (levels 1 through 3
with severity greatest at level 3);
base category is 0-5 years with
"minimal" (level 1 ) disturbance;
time and severity measures visually
determined at each plot (?)
Interaction term measuring effect
of channelization on plot market
values across different distances
from stream channel (-)
Euclidean distance from nearest
road to plot center (m) ( )
Number of sawtimber size oak
stems ( > 25.4 em) (+)
Number of sawtimber size cypress
stems ( > 25.4 em) (+)

Std. Dev.

155.79

1 13.80

70.57

STREAM_DIST
DISTURB

CHAN*STREAM

ROAD_DIST

Mean

Std. Dev.

515.00

471 .94

24.98

78.98

2 1 .70

1 14.66

89.78

192.41

160.95

2.10

0.91

2.50

0.69

142.96

76.73

2935.94

1 3984.76

760.18

475.77

0.52

1 .32

2.09

2.40

0.21

1 .04

0.50

1 .28

�

-

CLOSURE

=

-

OAK
CYPRESS

Notes: Signs in parentheses indicate expected relationship with the dependent variable PLOT_TOTAL.

Number of field plots.
streams are defined as streams that have not been channelized.

b Natural
•
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flexible generalized moments (Kelejian and Prucha 1999) procedure, which does not rely on
parametric assumptions for J.l, must be applied to the estimation of equation [ 1 3].
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests (if J.l; are normal) (Anselin et al. 1996) or the
Kelejian-Robinson (KR) test (if J.l; are not normal) (Kelejian and Robinson 1 992), where both
are asymptotic and x! distributed tests, provide statistical evidence for the most appropriate
econometric representation of the underlying spatial dependence (i.e., lag vs. error). As a
review, if the dependence is across neighboring values of the dependent variable, i.e.,
cov[ W; �]

-:t:.

0, then the spatial lag model is the appropriate representation. If the spatial

dependence is between error terms, cov[J.l;J.lj]

-:t:.

0, the spatial error model should be applied.

We believe, a priori, the spatial dependence to be of the spatial error type. Spatial dependence
in the error term can be modeled with OLS and yield unbiased coefficients, but these estimates
will be inefficient. In order to derive unbiased and efficient estimates, the spatial error model
is estimated by maximum likelihood, instrumental variables or generalized moments
procedures.
Tests for spatial dependence as well as significance and magnitude of estimated model
parameters are dependent on the specified weight matrix. In a hedonic price study of property
values in Maryland, Bell and Bockstael (2000) report empirical evidence on the sensitivity of
coefficients to different specifications of Z. In order to explicitly address this potential
problem, we estimate equation [ 1 3] with an inverse distance weight functional form of the
weight matrix with multiple cut-off or critical distances (d;/ ).
;

4. Results

The results of generalized moments estimation of equation [ 1 3] are reported in Table 8. A
variety of model diagnostic tests were conducted based on OLS estimation of the model and
1 14
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Table 8
Results of robust, generalized moments estimation of the spatial error model representation
of the implicit valuation model
Double-Log Model

Semi-Log Model

Square-Root Model

Plot Attribute

Robust GM
(du· = 800)

Robust GM
(du· = 1500)

Robust GM
(du* = 800)

Robust GM
(du" = 1 500)

Robust GM
(du" = 800)

Robust GM
(du· = 1 500)

CONSTANT

4.613*
(0.22329)

4.609*
(0.22438)

6.429*
(0.56977)

6.427*
(0.57471)

4.132*
(0.29556)

4.129*
(0.29648)

--{).933*
(0.22439)
0.014*
(0.00213)

--{).927*
(0.22578)
0.014*
(0.00214)

-1 .08*
(0.37941 )

--{).953*
(0.3875 1 ) ,

-1 .004*
(0.23349)

--{).986*
(0.23447)

0.682*
(0.07038)

0.678*
(0.07038)
0.228*
(0.02681 )

0.228*
(0.02681 )

--{).012
(0.00958)
-{). I 02
(0.07381)
0.001
(0.00104)

--{).012
(0.00957)
--{). 103
(0.07413)
0.002
(0.00104)

--{).018*
(0.00161)
0.1 1 1 *
(0.02137)
0. 1 82*
(0.03971 )
0.51 8
0.557

CHANNELIZED
(1=Yes)
CLOSURE

(%)

LNCANOPY_
CLOSURE
SQRTCANOPY_
CLOSURE
STREAM_DIST
(m)
LNSTREAMDISTANCE
SQRTSTREAM_
DISTANCE
DISTURB
CHAN* STREAM
ROAD_DIST
(m)
LNROAD_DIST

--{).001
(0.00045)

--{).001
(0.00045)
--{).030
(0.02846)

--{).105
(0.07548)
0.001
(0.00101)
-5.90E-5*
(0.0000 1)

--{). 106
(0.07584)
0.001
(0.00101)
-5.91E-5*
(0.0000 1)

--{).030
(0.02843)

--{).073
(0.07910)
0.001
(0.00107)

--{).076
(0.07947)
0.001
(0.00106)

--{).585*
(0.06032)

--{).589*
(0.06058)

SQRTROAD_DIST

)..

0. 1 1 8*
(0.02228)
0.173*
(0.04124)
0.4W

0.1 1 8*
(0.02227)
0.173*
(0.041 19)
0.469

0.107*
(0.021 36)
0.175*
(0.03985)
0.743

0.107*
(0.021 35)
0.178*
(0.03981)
0.760

--{).0 1 8*
(0.00160)
0. 1 12*
(0.021 37)
0.182*
(0.03975)
0.505

R2

0.528

0.522

0.639

0.600

0.565

OAK
( > 25.4 em)
CYPRESS
( > 25.4 em)

OLS diagnostics6
Jarque-Bera
Koenker-Bassett•
Kelejian-Robinson
Multicollinearity
condition number

1 07.889*
0.053
25.532*
1 0.866

26.737*

24.240*
0.498
68.379*
26.993

58.396*

3 1 .7 1 1 *
0.386
27.830*
16.710

23.946*

Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the market value of all standing pulpwood and sawtimber stems in each

field plot; * indicates significance at the 99% confidence level; 357 observations for each model; R2 values are
computed as the ratio of the variance of the predicted values over the variance of the observed values for market
value (Anselin 1 995).
• Standard errors are not computed for the spatial autoregressive parameter 'A in generalized moments estimation.
b The Jarque-Bera and Koenker-Basset (KB) tests and the multicollinearity condition number are calculated for the
same OLS model, regardless of the specified form of the spatial weights matrix. Accordingly, only one value for
each diagnostic is reported per set of models.
c The KB test is conducted against a model that has already been corrected for heteroskedasticity, thus we should
expect to fail to reject H0: constant error variance.
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include the following. Tests for normally distributed, homoskedastic error terms were strongly
rejected at the 99 percent confidence level (see Table 8 for Jarque-Bera and Koenker-Basset
statistics), thus robust, nonparametric estimation methods were applied. Robust estimation
included an additive, groupwise heteroskedasticity specification, with CHANNELIZED as the
grouping variable. Spatial lag and spatial error models were estimated but due to
nonnormality, only the null hypothesis of spatial independence could be tested in the spatial
error model.33 Results of the Kelejian-Robinson test for all spatial error models indicate
significant spatial dependence across the error terms of neighboring plots. Thus, a spatial error
representation of the spatial dependence inherent in the data is an appropriate econometric
specification of the valuation model.
Informal tests of potential model misspecification were conducted by specifying several
functional forms for both the spatial error model and the spatial weights matrix. Semilogarithmic, double-logarithmic, and square root functional forms of the spatial error model
were each estimated with two critical distances, 800m and 1 500m, defining the maximum
distance for two neighboring plots in the spatial weights matrix. The critical distances pertain
to the average (800m) and maximum ( 1 500m) distance between any two plots in a common
site. The qualitative results of these different model specifications are surprisingly similar,
indicating model validity and relevance of included explanatory variables. Each model
explained more than half of the variability in plot market values, which is a promising finding
given the considerable spatial variability in plot locations and the complex ecological
;

relationships between site attributes and productivity. This result indicates there is a common
set of measurable ecological factors that significantly influence forest productivity and market
values across the watershed. The core set of attributes (variables) significant in all models
33 Model estimation was conducted in SpaceStat (Anselin 1995), which currently does not provide
the Kelejian-Robinson test of spatial dependence for the spatial lag model. Accordingly, only the results
of the spatial error model are presented in Table 8.
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includes whether or not the plot is located along a stream that has been channelized, percent
canopy closure, distance (m) from the nearest road, and number of sawtimber size (> 25.4cm)
oak and cypress stems. The sign of each variable was consistent with our expectations.
Distance (m) from the stream channel, time elapsed since the last significant disturbance, and
an interaction term between stream channelization and distance from stream channel were not
significant in any model. These later terms may be insignificant due to the wide range of
ecological conditions present across the watershed, which confound the relationship between
each attribute and plot value.
An inverse distance weights (IDW) specification of the relationship between two

neighboring plots was used to define the spatial weights matrix in the spatial error models. We
experimented with multiple cut-off distances to test the extent of spatial interaction and found
significant spatial dependence up to 20km, after which the software was unable to compute the
model. In ecological research, it is reasonable to expect site attributes to be spatially correlated
across large expanses, or in the present case, an entire watershed, because of shared abiotic
and biotic processes endemic to the system. As discussed in Bell and Bockstael (2000),
though, row standardization of the spatial weights matrix, which is necessary for the
generalized moments estimation procedure, results in greater weight given to plots that are
more distant. 34 Consequently, while a significantly large cut-off distance (or simply, no cutoft) may seem sensible from an ecological modeling standpoint, it is computationally
intractable and improperly weights the strength of spatial dependence. To avoid this problem
and still incorporate the inverse relationship between distance and spatial dependence, we
choose to use the overall average and maximum distance between plots at a common site.
34 Row standardization refers to the recalculation of each cell of the spatial weights matrix by
dividing cell values by their respective row total such that the row sum of all new cell values equals I .
In the case of more distant plots with fewer neighbors and smaller weights, the row total is less than that
of plots in the opposite case. Accordingly, a smaller denominator will result in a larger row
standardized cell value (spatial weight), relative to non-standardization.
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Under this framework, the unmeasured components of plots are spatially dependent
(neighbors) if they are located in the same site and independent otherwise. As stated earlier,
model estimation results are qualitatively similar for the two cut-off distances, with coefficient
magnitudes only slightly lower for the greater cut-off distance.
In addition to testing the sensitivity of model estimates to different specifications of the
spatial weights matrix, we estimated equation [ 1 3] with three nonlinear functional forms.
Nonlinear models were specified because imposing linearity between the dependent and
independent variables requires the restrictive assumption of perfect substitutability between
each attribute. As an example, two oak trees cannot be substituted for one cypress tree. For all
three forms, the contribution of each continuous attribute (variable) to the economic value of
the plot increases at a decreasing rate, which is in accordance with the theoretical specification
in equation [ 1 0] . In the semi-log model, attribute contribution, measured by the parameter
estimate, is interpreted

as

the percentage change in plot value with a unit change in the

attribute (i.e., partial elasticity). For the double-log model, coefficients are interpreted as
elasticities; interpretation is not as straightforward for the square root model. Estimation
results for all three models are very similar, but the double-log model explains the most
variability in plot values for both specifications of the spatial weights matrix (R2 = 64 and 60
percent for d;/ = 800m and 1 500m, respectively).
Given that all six model specifications are qualitatively similar, choice of a particular
model for attribute interpretation and calculation of implicit prices will not lead to inconsistent
conclusions. We chose the' double-log model evaluated at a cut-off distance of 1 500m for three
reasons, foremost of which is our belief that the cut-off distance should be as great as possible
without compromising the integrity of the spatial weights. Second, of the three models
evaluated at 1500m, the double-log model explains the most variability in plot values. Finally,
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this model specification provides a parameter estimate for the key policy variable
CHANNELIZED that is approximately the average of the values reported in the semi-log and
square root models. Thus, based on generalized moments estimation of a double-log, spatial
autoregressive error representation of the implicit valuation model equation [ 1 3], the impact of
stream channelization on forested wetland market values is such that 95 percent of the average
economic value of the nearby forest is lost. Since channelization has been restricted for over
thirty years by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1 972 (Section 404),
this significant reduction in forest value reflects the cumulative damages to local forested
wetland productivity and condition caused by the negative externalities associated with
channelization, which include excessive sedimentation and channel bank and bed erosion.
Regarding the remaining variables, the coefficients for percent of overstory canopy closure
and number of sawtimber size oak and cypress stems were highly significant and positive.
Based on the estimates in Table 8, a one percent increase in canopy closure and a one unit
increase in oak and cypress stems results in a 68, 1 1 , and 1 8 percent increase in average plot
value, respectively. The variable capturing the relationship between distance from the nearest
road and plot values had the expected negative sign, indicating an inverse relationship
between plot value and distance, but reported an estimate greater in magnitude than we
expected. The average market value of a plot decreases by 59 percent for each one percent
increase in distance (m) between the plot and the nearest road.

5.

Implicit values
The economic values derived from the valuation framework are implicit since a direct

relationship does not exist between ecological attributes and channelization and the market
value of a forested wetland; value for these nonmarket site attributes arises from an indirect
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relationship with the aggregate economic value of merchantable wood in the wetland. Similar
to hedonic pricing, implicit prices are calculated from model first order conditions. For the
continuous variables, implicit prices are simply calculated by partially differentiating equation
[ 13] with respect to each variable and setting the solution equal to zero, holding all other
attributes constant (refer to Table 9). Prices for continuous variables are often referred to as
marginal implicit prices because they measure the monetary change in the dependent variable
as the result of a marginal, or one unit change, in a right hand side variable. Due to the discrete
nature of the variable CHANNELIZED, the implicit price for channelization is a measure of
the partial and not marginal effect on plot values. The implicit price (denoted IP) of damages
(negative externalities) associated with channelization is thus computed as the difference in
expected values of equation [ 1 3] when CHANNELIZED is set equal to one and zero, ceterus
paribus:

IPcHANNELIZED = E[LNPLOT_TOTALl Xt, CHANNELIZED = 1] - E[LNPLOT_TOTAL I Xt. CHANNELIZED = 0]

[14]

where k indexes remaining regressors (Long 1 997, p. 14). Table 9 provides the equations and
resultant implicit prices for the significant attributes from the double-log, spatial
autoregressive model (evaluated at 1 500m).
Following equation [14] and assuming natural stream conditions, the partial implicit price
for CHANNELIZED is _:'$2 17.54 per plot or -$5,438 ha·1. 3 5 Since natural streams are by
definition unchannelized, the impact of channelization on the market value of forested

35 We caution against aggregating the per plot damage value beyond a ha· 1 basis since we do not

know at present how far out these damages extend into the floodplain. The insignificant sign on the
interaction term CHAN*STREAM provides some evidence that the negative effects of channelization
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Table 9
Implicit prices for field plot attributes

Implicit Price

Natural Streams
(X1 = 0)
$21 7.54 per plot
-$21 7.54 per plot
CHANNELIZED6
X/2exp(y0 + y1X1 + y1X1 + ygX8)X6Y6 [$5438.44 ha-1)
[-$5438.44 ha-1)
X/2exp(y0 + y1X1 + y1X1 + ygX8)X6Y6
CLOSURE
$ 1 .3 1 per plot
$3.28 per plot
y2X/Y2 - l)exp(y0 + y1X1 + y7X7 + ygX8)X6Y6
(%)
[$32.86 ha-1]
($81 .92 ha-1]
1
-$6. 1 0 m·1
-$2.36 m·�
ROAD_DIST
y£)(/'6 - lexp(y0 + y1X1 + y�7 + ygX8)X2Y2
[-$236.00 kn11]
[$61 0.00 km-1]
(m)
$38.71 per plot
$15.43 per plot
OAK.
y�/2exp(y0 + y1X1 + y�7 + ygX8)X6Y6
[$967.69 ha-1]
[$385.78 ha-1]
( > 25.4 em)
$64.39
per plot
$25.67
per
plot
CYPRESS
y1X1
+
ygX8)X6Y6
/2exp(y0
y1X1
+
+
ygX
[$1609.80 ha-1]
[$641 .76 ha-1]
( > 25.4 em)
Note: Calculated implicit prices are based on coefficients from the robust, generalized moments estimation of the
spatial autoregressive error model listed in Column 5 of Table 8.
• Gamma notation identifies estimated parameters, with subscripts on each X denoting individual variables
(corresponding to the order given in Eq. [ 13]). The implicit price equation is equivalent to the marginal (partial)
effect of each continuous (discrete) variable on the dependent variable and is calculated for each data point and
then averaged. The sample average is reported in the Implicit Price columns.
b The partial effect of channelization on plot values is computed as in the following manner: LlE(YjX] I M1 =
E[ Y!Xk.Xi=O] - E( Y!X!.%, =1 ) .
Plot Attribute

Channelized Streams

Implicit Price Equation•

(X1 = 1)

wetlands along natural streams represents the potential outcome if the stream were to be
channelized. That is, a wood buyer would be willing to pay approximately $21 8 less for a site
that changed from an unaltered to an altered state, given sufficient passage of time so that the
full effects of the change are realized. Alternatively, the absolute value of these estimates
reflects the monetary gain in forest worth if channelized streams and surrounding impacted
forested wetlands were restored to their natural condition.
It is import�t to note that these values are based on delivered wood prices, which take into
account transportation and harvesting costs. These costs should not be included in the
valuation of on-site damages to forested wetlands. Accordingly, implicit prices reported in this
paper do not represent the true net value lost to society as a result of channelization. An

on plot values vary too much across different distances from the stream channel to uncover any
statistically significant relationship.
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average value for the percent of delivered prices that can be allocated to these costs is 39
percent, based on Timber Mart South (2003) data for our study area.
These estimates represent the first published findings of the significant, long-term
economic impacts channelization has had on forested wetlands, since earlier wetland valuation
research focused on valuing individual wetland services or entire wetland ecosystems. In
essence, our models show that channelization has had the unfortunate, unintended
consequence of impacting forested wetlands to such an extent that they can no longer produce
a viable supply of merchantable wood. Moreover, in terms of unmeasured, nonpriced site
attributes, the capacity of impacted sites to provide wildlife habitat, scenic beauty, nutrient
transformation, flood abatement, and water filtration has been severely diminished. By
depositing and facilitating the movement of excessive quantities of sediment, which stifles
plant, tree, and soil productivity and eventually reduces the site to an unproductive condition,
channelization has virtually homogenized the vegetative structure and composition of sites
along altered streams. Sites are now defined by a select number of understory and overstory
species that can survive in harsh, impacted conditions. The tree species of this set are of such
low market and ecological value that the economic worth of the wetland is reduced to mere
dollars and sustainability of the system compromised.
While we believe the monetary estimates of damages associated with channelization are
reasonable and defensible, a few caveats should be highlighted. First, the basis for the
valuation component of the model is an indirect relationship between the economic values an
;

individual places on merchantable wood and measurable on-site attributes. We acknowledged
that the relationship was not a first best solution for valuing site attributes (see footnote 32),
yet at the same time provided a means for linking productivity, ecological and anthropogenic
factors, and overall forest market value for the ultimate purpose of monetizing damages to
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both the site and the system. Beyond the somewhat complicated theoretical linkages, the
model relies on a quite simple concept that is consistent with economic theory in that attribute
value is measured by the additional amount an individual (i.e., wood buyer) is willing to pay
for a site with higher quality attributes. Conversely, an economic agent would be willing to
pay less for undesirable sites due to degraded attributes, which in our study is credited to
channelization and excessive sedimentation. Thus, while a direllt relationship would be
preferable for monetizing damages to forested wetlands, the implicit valuation framework
presented here represents an initial pass that is consistent with economic, ecological, and
spatial econometric theory.
The second caveat is a corollary to the first and identifies the values calculated with the
valuation model as use values, or measures of the usefulness of the resource to the individual.
Consequently, measures of nonuse values lost because of channelization cannot be captured in
the model. Third, the real applicability of the model is in valuing cumulative damages to
systems that are spatially and temporally dependent. For monetary assessment of damages
from immediate disturbances, whether human or natural, standard accounting or real estate
appraisal methods (e.g., replacement cost) should be applied. Last, since channelization is a
discrete event restricted for the last 30 years, the opportunity to internalize the negative
externalities is by definition limited. Thus, while the damage estimates may be used to
evaluate future channelization projects the more likely application may be to provide
information for restoring impacted sites, resource damage assessment, and ecosystem
management.
For the most part, these caveats apply to the implicit prices calculated for the remaining
significant site attributes. Based on the equation in Table 9, the marginal implicit price of a
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one percent increase in overstory canopy closure from the mean value of 79 percent is $3.28.36
This estimate implies that a landowner interested in maximizing the economic value of
pulpwood and sawtimber would pursue forest management strategies that lead to increases in
the percent of closure. The landowner would do so only to a point as the curvature of the
relationship between canopy closure and plot value indicates benefits increasing at a
decreasing rate. From an ecological and economic standpoint, this result is reasonable since
too much canopy closure would lead to increased competition and consequently reduced
growth rates and value. The marginal implicit price for a one meter increase in distance
between a plot and the nearest road is -$6. 1 0 or -$6 1 for each l OOm increase. The price of
increasing separation is not trivial and indicates that there is a zone wherein a landowner
should expend resources on forest management, since beyond the zone management costs
exceed benefits. Lastly, the marginal contribution to average plot value from an increase of
one oak and cypress tree species is $38.71 and $64.39, respectively. In terms of forest
management, a profit maximizing landowner in our study area should pursue artificial and
natural regeneration efforts until the marginal benefit of increased oak and cypress stems just
equals marginal planting and maintenance costs.

6. Conclusions
This paper presents the application of a spatial theoretic, implicit valuation model to
develop a set of implicit prices for factors affecting productivity and market value of forested
..

wetlands in the Hatchie River Watershed in West Tennessee. In particular, prices were
estimated

for

ecological

relationships

and

negative

externalities

associated

with

36 For this and the following site attributes, only the implicit prices computed for natural streams are
reported and discussed. The basis for the exclusion of prices for channelized streams in this discussion
is that landowners would not expend resources on marginal changes in the forest structure when those
resources would have greater value if expended toward overall site restoration.
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channelization. The costs of channelization are significant, with 95 percent of the market value
of a forest lost as a consequence of this anthropogenic activity. On a per hectare basis, a wood
buyer is willing to pay $5,438 less for a forest located along a channelized stream than a
similar forest located along a natural stream. These results indicate a role for forest
management in terms of restoration and more importantly, a significant role for stream
restoration projects that focus on returning the natural hydrolt'Jgical and sedimentation
processes to channelized streams.
The primary motivation for developing a model to value damages to forested wetlands
arose from inadequate knowledge of the economic magnitude of cumulative impacts that
negative anthropogenic factors have had on the integrity of forested wetlands. Previous
research predominately focused on valuing the ecological functions and services provided by
wetlands and valued by individuals, whereas this research addressed the valuation of
individual attributes that affect site quality and overall system functioning. We applied spatial
econometric procedures because of the inherent interconnectedness among ecological
attributes across the watershed. Failing to recognize these relationships would have resulted in
a misspecified model and possibly biased implicit prices. Nonparametric estimation
procedures allowed

us

to address the nonnormal distribution of the unobserved component

across plots and different functional forms of both the spatial weights matrix and the model
were tested to assess the sensitivity of estimated parameters. The results of nonparametric,
spatial autoregressive error estimation of the different specifications were surprisingly stable,
thereby lending credibility to the valuation framework and resultant implicit prices. However,
while the method applied in this study is simple and flexible it provides prices for only a small
subset of the attributes of a forested wetland ecosystem. Accordingly, this method should be
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used in addition to other wetland valuation techniques and under different ecological
conditions to determine the economic value of forested wetland attributes.
In a general sense, wetland valuation can provide useful information for cost benefit
analysis, policy evaluation, resource damage assessment, ecosystem management, and
increasing public awareness of the importance of wetlands. Specific to the case of valuing
damages to forested wetlands, economic information in the form of implicit prices provides
balanced information to stakeholders on the tradeoffs between discrete activities, such as
draining and filling a wetland or leaving the resource in tact. Prior to the Clean Water Act
Amendments, the potential consequences of channelization in terms of diminished ecosystem
productivity and lost timber revenue were probably assumed negligible or discarded
altogether. If the responsible party, i.e., the damager, were to have to access to the present
information then decisions regarding channelization projects might have been at least delayed
and possibly canceled. Of course, we will never know the outcome, but when evaluating
present and future system altering projects, this type of information may play a critical role in
balancing potential costs and benefits.
The greatest role for valuing damages to forested wetlands may be in the evaluation of
alternative stream and wetland restoration projects. Since many of the benefits of restoration
are nonmarket in nature there is a positive probability they will be under or over stated in a
cost benefit analysis. Restoration efforts, then, can be made more efficient by including the
implicit prices of damages to nonmarket attributes. Additionally, given budget and time
;

constraints, agencies and individuals pursuing restoration can use this information to guide the
selection process toward those sites that have endured the greatest nonmarket losses.
However, for some forested wetlands located along channelized streams, especially in our
study area, restoration may not be economically feasible as the sites are severely degraded. In
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these cases, the costs outweigh the benefits and the goals of the restoration project may be
better served elsewhere.
Valuation, though, is just one step in the process toward restoring altered streams and
degraded forested wetlands. The greatest challenge for future valuation research may lie in
communicating the results of valuation studies to communities, policy makers, and resource
specialists in a comprehendible format. Incorporating the interests of these stakeholders in the
initial phases of the valuation process may help to ensure that efforts are directed toward the
most important issues and result in lasting, tangible outcomes.
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This dissertation approached the valuation of environmental quality in two Tennessee
watersheds from both applied and theoretical perspectives. The theory underlying each
application was presented to demonstrate the basis for selection of specific valuation
methodologies, highlight weaknesses, and opportunities for extension to other problems. Two
spatially and ecologically distinct watersheds were selected for the applied analyses because
of a common lack of information regarding economic values of environmental quality. While
each watershed has a specific set of factors responsible for present environmental conditions
both watersheds could benefit from information on the costs of past damages and benefits of
future improvements. Environmental valuation and advanced econometric models provide a
framework for valuing such costs and benefits. This dissertation provides economic
information

for environmental quality that can help landowners,

non-landowners,

stakeholders, and policy makers collectively work together to improve the state of the
environment and progress toward environmental sustainability within the context of further
economic growth and development.
The three primary chapters in this dissertation are linked by a common objective of
extending current environmental valuation techniques. The first chapter outlined necessary
conditions for three separate economic agents to satisfy in order for a hypothetical forest
amenity enhancement program to be realized. A representative contributor, third party nonprofit organization, and profit maximizing forest landowner comprised the three agents. A
random utility behavioral model was selected for the analysis of necessary contributor
"

conditions, value maximization model with a budget balancing constraint for the third party,
and a profit maximization model incorporating ecological capacity and environmental ethic
for the landowner. The forest amenity enhancement program was described as a program
administered by the third party and funded with individual contributions that supported private
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landowners who undertook forest amenity improvement activities. Theoretical and
mathematical analysis of agent behavior within the enhancement program showed such a
program was possible as long as agents choose factor levels that optimized their respective
constrained objective (i.e., utility, value or profit). This is a standard microeconomic result but
further analysis of agent behavior revealed that even if they behave optimally the presence of
free-riders in the economy will undermine program success. Furthermore, abstracting from the
efficiency reducing effects of free-riding behavior, I presented two cases where the program
may succeed but not provide the optimal level of amenities and one case of an inconsistent
outcome (see Figure 1 , p. 47). This latter result derives from a disconnect (or information gap)
between contributors representing demand and forest landowners that control the physical
supply of forest amenities. It is this case that is of most interest for the success of the
hypothetical forest amenity enhancement program and for evaluating the possibility of
actually implementing a similar program in Tennessee.
The second chapter extended the theoretical analysis using data on individual choices and
willingness to pay for improved forest amenities solicited in a choice modeling based survey.
The results of econometric analysis of these data revealed that people are willing to pay
approximately $25 per year for 5 years for improved forest amenities (see Table 6, p. 87).
However, the majority of forest landowners (representing amenity supply) are not in favor of
undertaking management activities to improve the supply (see Tables 3 and 5, p. 76 and p.
81). Thus, the theoretical disconnect presented in the first chapter is empirically verified in the
results of the second chapter. Collectively, these results suggest significant extension efforts
may be necessary in order for a forest amenity enhancement program to be realized in
Tennessee (more specifically, the Emory-Obed Watershed). These efforts should be focused
on informing landowners of not only the public benefits of forest amenities but also possible
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incentive-based schemes that would compensate landowners for amenity related management
costs. Additionally, focused extension efforts would be able to inform forest managers and
landowners of the types and levels of forest amenities the public prefers and how much they
would be willing to pay to secure improvements from the current state. Given increasing urban
development pressures in our study area and in the South in general, alternative compensation
options that would enable forest landowners to maintain their land in its natural state must be
explored. Environmental valuation offers a legitimate and promising means for valuing and
evaluating such options.
In addition to complementing the theoretical analysis in the first chapter, data collected
from the choice modeling survey were applied to an analysis of information effects in stated
preference environmental valuation. A spatial information effect was defmed to be the
influence on survey respondent preferences of forest land cover (m2) within a 1 OOm radius of
their residence. An aspatial information effect was defined to be the influence a researcher has
on respondent preferences by simply altering the framing, or information content, of the
survey. I altered the choice modeling survey by introducing an additional statement in one of
the two survey versions informing respondents of the potential that 50 wooded acres in their
area would be converted to a residential development. Results for the spatial information
effects test reveal that spatial information affected choices but not stated willingness to pay
(see Tables 4 and 6, p. 79 and p. 87; discussion on page 85). However, for the aspatial
information effects test, differences in survey framing significantly affected both choices and
"

stated willingness to pay (Tables 4 and 6). Thus, respondent preferences and ultimately
choices were influenced by both types of information but only one type changed willingness
to pay. The significance of the aspatial information test for stated preference environmental
valuation is that researchers could achieve a desired result by simply including information
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they know will influence people to choose a certain way. The significance of the spatial
information test is that to date no other published study has incorporated spatial land cover in
a stated choice framework.
Finally, the third chapter presented an innovative approach for valuing damages to
forested wetlands using an implicit pricing model adapted from hedonic price theory and
spatial econometrics. The basis for this study was research conducted during Summer 2002
across 3 counties and 357 field plots in the Hatchie River Watershed, West Tennessee.
Information from these field plots served as principal input in the implicit pricing model,
which involved three stages. First, the aggregate market value of the forest at each field plot
was determined by summing over the product of volume and market price by class (i.e.,
sawtimber or pulpwood). Next, site specific attributes known to affect the quantity of volume,
species presence, and class distribution were measured at each plot and then incorporated in
the econometric model. These attributes included both ecological, such as canopy closure, and
anthropogenic factors, namely, channelization. In the third stage, the aggregate forest value
was econometrically decomposed into the economic contribution of individual site attributes.
Several functional forms of the implicit pricing model and underlying spatial dependence
among unmeasured cross-site attributes were estimated in order to assess the reliability of the
model and sensitivity to different assumptions. For all functional forms, though, a common
nonparametric, first-order spatial autoregressive error model was specified. The double
logarithmic representation of this model was found to provide the best fit and most defensible
interpretation of estimated parameters (see Table 8, p. 1 1 5). Generalized moments estimation
of the double logarithmic, first-order spatial autoregressive error model revealed significant
impacts channelization and excessive sedimentation have had on the ecological productivity
and market value of local forested wetlands (Table 8). Through first order differentiation of
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the spatial econometric model, an economic value of -$2 1 8 per plot or -$5,438 ha-1 was
imputed to these impacts (Table 9, p. 121). The significance of these results is three-fold.
First, through the application of an environmental valuation technique economic values have
been assigned to formerly unpriced negative externalities associated with channelization.
Second, these values can be used to update present benefit cost analyses that involve
channelization of streams in forest wetland systems or weight more appropriately the potential
ecological damages associated with channelization in future analyses. Last, these results hold
significance in justifying the economic benefits of restoring impacted streams and wetlands to
their original condition (+$2 1 8 per plot or +$5,438 ha-1).
Pooling the results of each study, the usefulness of environmental valuation for linking the
economy and the environment through the development of prices is unambiguous. Moreover,
these studies show the complicated theory and econometric analysis underlying environmental
valuation and hopefully, legitimize further application of nonmarket methods for deriving
market values.
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Appendix A

Definitions for Non-Timber Forest Benefits and Quality Levels Included in Choice Modeling
Survey

(1) Recreational Opportunities
LOW: The landowner does not allow the non-paying public to hike, camp, fish, hunt or
birdwatch (or simply, to recreate) on any portion of his/her land.
MEDIUM: The landowner allows the public to recreate on some portion of his/her land.
Additionally, only a certain type of recreation (for example, hunting or hiking) is allowed.
HIGH: The landowner allows the public to recreate on all of his/her land and all the types of
recreation listed above are allowed.

(2)

Stream Quality
LOW: The landowner disturbs (by harvesting or road building, for example) almost all of the

forest and natural vegetation found along streams and on steep hillsides. As a result, soil
erosion is increased and the quality of the water for drinking, swimming, and fishing declines.
MEDIUM: The landowner disturbs some of the forested and natural vegetation found along
streams and on steep hillsides. Soil erosion still occurs, but not to the point found in LOW.
HIGH: The landowner does not disturb any of the forested and natural vegetation found along
streams and on steep hillsides. Additionally, the landowner plants trees and native plants along
stream banks and hillsides to help slow soil erosion.
(3) Scenic Beauty
LOW: Very little open space among the trees, trees are crowded and smaller in size, and there

are few plants on the ground.
MEDIUM: Trees are more openly spaced and you can see into the forest. Trees are of
moderate size and there are more plants on the ground than in the LOW level.
HIGH: Trees are openly spaced, trees are large in size and there are many plants (both in type
and quantity) on the ground.
(4)

Wildlife Habitat
LOW: The landowner does not actively manage his/her land for improved wildlife habitat.
MEDIUM: The landowner manages some of his/her land for native game or non-game

animals. In order to do this, the landowner follows a management plan written by a wildlife
resource professional.
HIGH: The landowner manages all of his/her land for either native game or non-game species,
or both. The landowner manages the land according to a management plan written by a
wildlife resource pr�fessional.
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APPENDIX B
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for All Components ofthe Choice Modeling Survey in Part 3
Status Quo Information

Development (n=8 1 5)

No Development (n=l 045)

Demographic Variables
Cumberland (Cumberland)

Age
Household size
Length of residence
Level of education
Income
Land Size (Land Size)
Male
Public and private forest participation
Outdoor or environmental group or
organization member

Mean
(Std. dev.)

No.
obs.

0.79
(0.4079)
58.41
(14.268 1)
2.33
(0.9553)
1 8.86
( 1 8 .9403)
3 .43
( 1 . 1 684)
48903.01
(22778.8700)
6.89
( 1 6.0677)
0.75
(0.43 5 1 )
0.55
(0.4980)
0.16
(0.3654)

1 045
1 045
1 040
1 035
1 045
1010
1 045
1 045
1 045
1 040

Mean
{Std. dev.}

No.
obs.

0.70
(0.4588)
53 . 1 2
( 1 5.3227)
2.56
( 1 .0752)
22.22
(20.7792)
3 .20
( 1 . 1 738)
47 1 94.52
(24536.6500)
1 3 . 1 44
(23.0065)
0.67
(0.47 1 0)
0.6 1
(0.4886)
0. 1 8
(0.3878)

815

�

815
815
810
815
795
815
815
815
815

Attitudinal Variablei

"Forests should be utilized in such a
manner that they are in the same
condition or better for future
generations"
"Forests should not be managed and
instead allowed to take the course of
nature"
"Forests are important for wildlife,
water quality, and landscape
appearance"
"In your opinion, what is the primary
threat t o the future o f Tennessee forests"
[Urban and commercial development
1 ; Otherwise = 0]
"How would you rate, on a scale of 0 to
5, your knowledge of forests and trees"

0.94
(0.2327)

1 045

0.95
(0.2 1 62)

815

0.77
(0.4 1 9 1 )

1 035

0.82
(0.3845)

805

0.97
(0. 1 678)

1 03 5

0.98
(0. 1 349)

810

0.50
(0.5001)

1 035

0.55
(0.4979)

810

2.78
( 1 . 1 294)

1 040

2.87
( 1 .0958)

810

7.42
(6.8446)

1 045

7.69
(7.2743)

815

=

(Knowledge)

GIS Variable

Forest Cover within l OOm buffer of
respondent [Forest Cover: sum of
(COV8, 9, 1 0) /1 000)]
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APPENDIX B (continued)

Status Quo Information

No Development (n=1 045)

Survey Design Variables

"Please rate the difficulty that you may
have had in filling out this survey" [No
difficulty = 1 ; Some difficulty = OJ
"Please rate the level of importance the
Contribution Amount of each option
played in your final decision" [Equal in
importance to the nontimber forest
benefits = 1 ; No role in my decision =
OJ

"Please rate the level of confidence you
have in the answers you have provided
[Full confidence = 1 ;
us"
Some confidence = OJ
Plan Score

Contribution Amount

Development (n=8 1 5)

Mean
(Std. dev.)

No.
obs.

Mean
(Std. dev.)

No.
obs.

0.3 1 1
(0.463 1)

1 045

0.37
(0.4838)

805

0.68
(0.4669)

1 030

0.56
(0.49681)

805

0.69
(0.4624)

1 035

0.71
(0.45409)

810

3.34
( 1 . 8737)
22.69
(20.3687)

1 045

3.65
( 1 . 8443)
26.67
(2 1 .03 70)

815

1 045

815

• Terms in parentheses denote variable names applied in econometric analysis of choices. Statistics based on actual

choices made by participants.
Survey respondents were asked to select one of five possible choices for the first three attitudinal questions:
strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree. The five response format was condensed to a
dichotomous agree or disagree variable; neutral responses are grouped with the strongly disagree and disagree
choices. The results with neutral responses grouped in the agree category are similar to those presented and are
available from the author.

b

;
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SAS Code for Designing Cho i ce Model ing Ques t i onnaire

( compl ements o f Maj or Je f f Smi th , Ph . D . Candidate in Econ . , Univ . of
Tenn . , Knoxvi l l e )
********************************************************************
*
*
*
Thi s program :
*
*
- Provides an orthogonal combinat i on o f a t t r ibutes and
*
*
a t t ribute qual i ty l evel s for a cho i c e model ing based
*
*
que s t i onnai re
*
�
*
*
*
( Fi gure 2 )
*
********************************************************************
/ *Thi s f o l l ows Tech Note TS- 6 7 7 E ,
%mktex ( 4 3 3 ,

part icularly the

" Chai r Exampl e " . * /

n=3 * 3 * 4 )

/ * Create an e f f ic i ent design from the f u l l factorial .
means that I have three a t tributes , one with 4 l eve l s ,
l eve l s .
Here , n equal s the f u l l factorial . * /

Thi s coding
and two wi th 3

data f inal ( drop= i ) ;
s e t des i gn end=eof ;
retain f 1 - f 2 1 f 3 0 ;
output ;
i f eof then do ;
array x [ 6 ] x1 -x3 f 1 - f3 ;
do i = 1 to 6 ;
output ;
end ;
run ;

x[i]

= i l e 3 or i eq 6 ;

end ;

/ *Thi s s t ep create s the ful l factorial candidate s e t with variables
x1 through x3 , because I only have three a t t ributes , and a s s igns a 1
in the f l ag column to leve l s of a t tributes that can be in any opt ion
( co lumns f 1 - f2 ) .
The f inal observa t i on is the s tatus quo , or bas e
opt ion , and i t i s coded wi th a 1 in t h e f 3 column .
The observa t i ons
with f lag codes f1 and f 2 can be u s ed for any a l ternative o f the
f irst two a l t e rnat ive s , whi l e the f 3 observa t i on may only be the
third opt ion ( the s t a tus quo ) . * /
/ * Op t i ons =noprint in cho i c e f f and mktblk suppre s s the output .
f inal mktlab wi l l print the output of interes t . * /
%choic e f f ( data= f inal , mode l = c l as s ( x1 -x3 ) ,
f l ags = f 1 - f 3 , beta= z ero ) ;

nset s = 1 8 ,

The

max i t er= 1 0 0 ,

/ * Thi s set create s the mos t e f f i c i ent des i gn .
Ns e t s equal s 1 8 choi c e
s e t s with t h e opt ions that vary and i t adds in the s tatus quo opt i on
to each cho i c e set . * /
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Appendix C (continued)

%rnktblock ( data=be s t ,

na l t s = 3 ,

nblocks = 2 ,

factors=x1 -x3 )

*This opt ion blocks the des i gn into two blocks with 3 a l terna t ives
and 9 choice s e t s . * /
data key ;
input payment endangered $ readines s $ ;
format payment dol larS . O ;
datal ines ;
High
Low
0
10
25
50

Medium Medium
High
Low

%rnkt lab ( data=blocked ,

key=key)

/ *Thi s opt i on a s s igns labe l s to each of my al ternat ives . * /
proc print ;

by block set ;

run ;

/ * Thi s prints the f inal 1 8 choi c e s e t s ,

;
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by bloc k ,

by set . * /

Appendix D
SAS Code for Con t ingency Tabl e Analys i s of Choi ce Model ing Res u l t s

******* *************************************************************
*
*
*
*
Thi s program :
*
*
- Conduct s Cochran-Mante l -Haen s z e l T e s t s of condi t ional
*
*
independence for i xjxk tables o f matched pairs
*
*
*
*
( Table 3 )
********************************************************************
/ * code for informat i on e f fec t s , contro l l ing for county * /
data two_cho ices ;
set choices ;
i f cho i c e ge 1 ;
run ;
opt i ons l ine s i z e = 7 6 nodate nonumber ;
proc freq data=two_choi c e s ;
table s cnty_c l * type_dl * op t ion2_1 I chi sq cmh nocol nopct agree ;
run ;

/ * code for l andowner e f f ec t s : control l ing for county* /
opt ions l ines i z e = 7 6 noda t e nonumber ;
proc f req data= two_choi c e s ;
table s cnty_c l * land2_med*op t i on2_1 I chi sq cmh nocol nopct agree ;
run ;
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Appendix E
LimDep Code for Es tima t ing Mu l t inomi a l and Mixed Logi t Models

********************************************************************
*
*
*
*
Thi s program :
*
*
-Creates new variabl es
*
*
-Est imates mixed logi t model s wi th correl ated coe f f ic i en t s
*
*
- E s t imates marginal e f f e c t s
*
*
- E s t imates coe f f i c i en t di stributions
*
*
*
*
*
*
( Tables 4 & 5 )
********************************************************************
CREATE

J = Trn ( - 3 , 0 )
ASC1 = ( J= 1 ) ; ASC2 = ( J= 2 ) ; ASC3 = ( J= 3 )
B_C = ASC 1 + ASC2
COV_A = ( CODE8A + CODE9A + CODE1 0A ) I 1 0 0 0
COV_B = ( CODE8 B + CODE9B + CODE 1 0 B ) I 1 0 0 0
COVA_1 = COV_A + 1
LNCOVA1 = LOG ( COVA_1 )
BC_1COVA = B_C * LNCOVA1
B_C * TYPE_D1 $
BC_TYPE
B_C * LAND_MED $
BC_LAND
B_C * COV_A $
BC_COVA
B_C * COV_B $
BC_COVB
BC_KNOWLEDG = B_C * KNOWLEDG $
BC_CNTY = B_C * CNTY_C 1 $
B_C * LAND2_ME $
BC_LO

Rej ec t ;

I

I

BC_TYPE= - 9 9 9
B_C = - 9 9 9
LN_ATTRS = - 9 9 9 I BC_1COVA= - 9 9 9
BC_LAND = - 9 9 9 1 BC_KNOWL= - 9 9 9 $
BC_CNTY= - 9 9 9

I

CALC ; Ran ( 3 4 5 6 9 ) $
NLOGIT
Lhs = CHOICE
Rhs = PAYMENT , B_C , LN_ATTRS , BC_1COVA , BC_TYPE , BC_CNTY ,
BC_LAND , BC_KNOWL
Cho i c e s = C , B , A
; Tlg = l . d- 1 0
RPL
; Fen = PAYMENT ( N ) , B_C ( N ) , LN_ATTRS ( N) , BC_1COVA ( N ) ,
BC_TYPE ( N ) , BC_CNTY ( N ) , BC_LAND ( N ) , BC_KNOWL ( N )
Ef fec t s :

PAYMENT [ C , B ] I B_C [ C , B ] I LN_ATTRS [ C , B ] I
BC_1COVA [ C , B ] I BC_TYPE [ C , B ] I BC_CNTY [ C , B ]
BC_LAND [ C , B ] I BC_KNOWL [ C , B ]

Cor
Pds = 5
Pts = 1 0 0 0
Hal ton $
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Appendix E (continued)

?Coe f f ic i ent D i s t r ibut i ons
calc ;

cal c ;

-0 . 25077 / 2 . 68552 ;
cov_az
list ; x
phi ( cov_a z ) ;
list ; z
1 -x $
type
0 . 7 1 6 8 0 / 7 . 17740 ;
list ; x
phi ( type ) ;
list ; z
1 -x $
score
0 . 5 7 3 17 / 0 . 913 5 6 ;
l ist ; x
phi ( score ) ;
list ; z
1 -x $
pay
-0 . 0449 0 / 0 . 0 0 0 04 ;
l i st ; x
phi ( pay ) ;
l i st ; z
1 -x $
asc
4 . 2 5 2 0 2 / 12 . 7 6 3 6 6 ;
list ; x
phi ( asc ) ;
list ; z
1 -x $
-0 . 00484/ 0 . 29212 ;
land
=

=

cal c ;

=

=

=

cal c ;

=

=

=

calc ;

=

=

=

calc ;

list ;
l is t ;

x
z

=

=

phi ( land ) ;
1 -x $
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Appendix F
LimDep Code for Es t ima ting WTP

********************************************************************
*
*
*
*
Thi s program :
*
*
-Est imates wi l l ing to pay
*
*
- E s t imates standard errors with the del ta method
*
*
*

-Te s t s whether WTPs are di f ferent from each other
- E s t imates 9 5 % con f i dence interva l s

*
*
*
*
*
( Tabl e 6 )
********************************************************************
Wal d ;

cal c ;

cal c ;

S tart
Var
Fn1
Fn2
Fn3

bbp i
varbbp ;
?WTP Plan Score 0 to 2
( - b3 * 2 ) /b1 ;
?WTP PS 0 to 2 , DEVELP 0 t o 1
- ( b3 * 2 +b5 ) /b1 ;
( b 4 * 7 . 5 3 6 - ( b3 * 2 +b4 * 7 . 1 5 9 ) ) /b 1 $ ? 5 % reduct ion in
? fore s t cover

=
( 4 1 . 49930899-25 . 53351507) /3 . 5849211 ;
l i s t ; z calc
? Tes t ing nul l hypothe s i s that $ 4 1 . 5 0 is d i f ferent f rom $ 2 5 . 5 3
pvalue
1 - Phi ( z cal c , 1 ) ;
tablevlu = Ntb ( . 9 5�1 ) $

l i s t ; z calc
( 5 7 . 4 2 4 6 3 9 85 - 4 1 . 4 9 9 3 0 8 99 ) /6 . 7066264 ;
? Te s t ing nul l hypothes i s that $ 5 7 . 4 2 from MNL model i s
? d i f f e rent f rom $ 4 1 . 5 0 M L model
1 - Phi ( z cal c , 1 )
pvalue
tablevlu
Ntb ( . 9 5�1 ) $
=

=

cal c ;

cal c ;

=
( 3 9 . 7118983 0 - 2 5 . 53351507) /4 . 6242656 ;
l i s t ; z _calc
? Te s t ing nul l hypothes i s that $ 3 9 . 7 1 f rom MNL model i s
? di f f erent f rom $ 2 5 . 5 3 ML mode l
pvalue
1 - Phi ( z cal c , 1 )
t ablevlu = Ntb ( . 9 5�1 ) $

list ;

conf iu1
conf i l 1
conf iu2
conf i l 2
conf iu3
conf i l 3

=

;=
=

25
25
41
41
27
27

.
.
.
.
.
.

53351507+
53351507499308 99+
499308996 3 92 9610+
63929610-

(2
(2
(2
(2
(2
(2

1 50

.
.
.
.
.
.

6448536*2
64 4 8 5 3 6 * 2
6448536*3
6448536*3
6448536*2
6448536*2

.
.
.
.
.
.

6863059)
6863059)
58492 1 1 )
58492 1 1 )
6960093 )
6960093 )

1

$

Appendix G
Procedures for Es t ima t ing Spa t i a l A u t oregress i ve Error Models in
Spa ceS t a t

*********************************************************** *********
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Thi s program :
- Provides procedures for the genera l i z ed moments
e s t imator of f i rs t -order spat i a l autoregress ive
econometric mode l s

*

*

*

*

*

( Table 8 )

********************************************************************

NOTE : SpaceS t a t i s a menu driven s o f tware , thus the f o l l owing i s a
rudimentary out l ine ( as opposed to spec i f i c coding ) f or e s t imating
spat i a l econometric mode l s .

STEPS :

(1)

I n ArcView , u s e the " Da t a " opt i on to convert the table
component o f the shape f i l e t o a SpaceStat f i l e

(2)

I n SpaceStat , s e l e c t
" Create Matrix "

(3)

Next , select " Too l s " then " D i s tance Weights "
Weight s " or " Inverse D i s tance Wei ght s "

(4)

Select " Regre s s " then " C la s s i c Mode l "
heteroskeda s t i c i ty spec i f icat ion

(5)

Repeat S t ep

(4)

" Too l s "

then " Di stance Weight s "

then

then " Cont i gu i ty

then e i ther

f or various spa t i a l economet r i c mode l s
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Appendix H

\

Arcinfo AML for Bu ffering,

In tersecting,

and Condensing Land Cover

In forma t i on
********************************************************************
*

*
*
*
*
*

Thi s program :
-Buf fers georeferenced points , inters e c t s buf fers and
underlying land cover coverage ( po lygon ) , and then sums
over a l l land cover c l as s e s

*
*
*

*
*

*
*

( Tabl e s 2 through 6 )

*

********************************************************************

&args cross 1_u - id
& i f [ nul l %cro s s 1_u - id% ] &then &return
Usage : &r do_it < cross 1_u - id>
& i f [ l ength %cro s s 1_u - i d% ] eq 1 &then & s housetext O O %cro s s 1_u- id%
& e l s e & i f [ length % c ro s s 1_u- id% ] eq 2 &then &s housetext
O % cross 1_u- id%
&el s e &s housetext %cross 1_u- id%
&type %cross 1_u- id% %housetext%
&s
&s
&s
&s
&s
&s

inpntcover cro s s 1_u
inpntinfo cro s s 1_u
inplycover clas s_uc
outpntcover pnt%housetex t %
outbufcover buf %housetext%
outintcover int %housetext%

/ * &goto SKIP
reselect % i npntcover% %outpntcover% point
reselect % inpntinfo% - i d eq %cro s s 1_u- id%
n
n
/ * Below " borrowed "

f rom buf fer wi z ard

/ * Begin : Buf fer Wi tard
/ * Aml script crea ted with ArcToolBox for tool : Buf fer Wi zard
/ * Edit ing thi s f i le may make it unreadable to the ArcToolbox
BUFFER %outpntcover% j unkO # # 1 0 5 # POINT
BUFFER %outpntcover% xxxtempO # # 1 0 0 # POINT
TABLES
SEL xxxtempO . PAT
ALTER INSIDE
INS IDEO
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Appendix H (continued)

QUIT
RENAME xxxtemp O % outbu f c over%
ADDITEM %outbufcover% . PAT %outbufcover% . PAT INS IDE 5 5 I
ADDITEM %outbufcover% . PAT %outbufcover% . PAT c r o s s 1_u- i d 3 3 I
TABLES
SELECT %outbufcover% . PAT
0
CALCULATE INSIDE
100
RESELECT INS IDEO
100
CALCULATE INSIDE
AS ELECT
DROPITEM
%outbufcover% . PAT INSIDEO
DROPITEM
%outbu f c over% . PAT xxxtemp O #
DROPITEM
%outbufcover% . PAT xxxtemp O - ID
RESELECT %outbufcover% - id ne 0
%cross 1_u - i d%
calculate cros s 1_u - i d
QUIT
&if

[ ex i s t s xxxtemp O - cove r ]

/ * End :

& then KILL xxxtempO ALL

Buf fer Wi z ard

c l ip % inplycover% j unkO j unk1
intersect j unk1 %outbu f c over% %outintcover%
&if
&if

[ ex i s t s j unkO -cove r ]
[ ex i s t s j unk1 -cover ]

&then ki l l j unkO a l l
&then ki l l j unk1 a l l

& l abel SKIP
frequency %out intcover% . PAT %out intcover% . FRQ
grid-code
ins ide
cros s 1_u- id
end
area
end

&return

&do i
1 &to 3 7 2
& r do_i t % i %
&end
&re turn
=
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